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I. INTRODUCTION
IO that ancient legal clich6, "Hard cases make bad law," Mr. Justice
Holmes offered an amendment and added an explanation:
Great cases like hard cases make bad law. For great cases are called great, not by
reason of their real importance in shaping the law of the future, but because of
some accident of immediate overwhelming interest which appeals to the feelings and
distorts the judgment. These immediate interests exercise a kind of hydraulic pressure
which makes what previously was clear seem doubtful, and before which even well
settled principles of law will bend.'
Such a great and hard case is Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino.2
It is a great case because it involved a fragment of the billion dollars
worth of American property nationalized by Cuba; it is a hard case be-
cause a well-settled principle of law, previously clear, seemed at the
moment of doubtful efficacy to the lower courts and was abandoned. The
Supreme Court of the United States, on its review of the case, restored
this well-settled principle of law-the act of state doctrine. The "immedi-
ate overwhelming interest" of the case was the worsening of relations
between the United States and Cuba.
The issue the lower courts decided was title to certain property-a
shipload of sugar, in Cuba when sold, to be paid for in New York, though
the property never entered the United States and was never under the
jurisdiction of a United States court. In Cuba early in August 1960, a
predominantly American-owned Cuban sugar corporation began lightering
a quantity of its sugar to shipside, as the first step in delivery of sugar
1. Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400-01 (1904) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
2. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 193 F. Supp. 375 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), aff'd, 307
F.2d 845 (2d. Cir. 1962), rev'd 32 U.S.L. Week 4229 (U.S. Mar. 23, 1964).
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under the terms of a contract it had with a broker-dealer3 in New York.
The ship, lying offshore but in Cuban territorial waters, was to take the
sugar to Morocco when loaded, for the New York broker-dealer had
already resold the sugar to customers in that far-off country. Before the
loading was finished, on August 6, 1960, Cuba by an Executive Resolu-
tion designated that sugar company as one to be nationalized, its assets
seized, title to be vested in the State and its liabilities assumed. All this
was done under a decree law issued by Cuba a month earlier applying
to all American-owned property in Cuba but which at the time issued did
not separately and specifically designate the properties to be affected.'
The properties to be seized without compensation' were to be identified
thereafter by just such an Executive Resolution.
With seizure, the sugar company, no longer in possession of its assets in
Cuba, its management excluded from its Cuban property, and unable to
secure bills of lading or obtain clearance for the ship, could not fulfill its
contract with the New York broker-dealer. The Cuban Government had
control over the ship and its cargo and thereupon offered to sell this ship-
load of sugar to the very same broker-dealer in New York whose contract
with the sugar company Cuba had frustrated. To obtain the necessary
amount of sugar to fulfill its contract with its Moroccan customers, the
New York broker-dealer signed a second contract to buy again that same
shipload of sugar; this time its contract was with an agency of the Cuban
Government. This new contract was on the same terms as the original
contract with the sugar company as to price, quantity, destination, and
payment in New York.
With this new contract signed and the loading of sugar completed, the
Cuban Government permitted the ship to sail, and the bills of lading with
draft attached were transmitted by the Cuban Government, for collection
through banking channels, to the New York branch of a foreign bank.
On the very day that the bank presented the draft, with bills of lading
attached, to the broker-dealer for payment, the producer of the sugar
(the sugar company), which had held the original contract, injected
itself into the situation under a claim of original and continuing owner-
ship of the sugar.' With some assets in New York, the officers there spoke
in the name of the company.
3. The purchaser of the sugar was Farr, Whitlock & Co., a partnership with its prin-
cipal office in New York. The partners were F. Shelton Farr, William F. Prescott, Emet
Whitlock, Lawrence H. Dixon, H. Bartow Farr, Elizabeth C. Prescott, Fabio Freyre and
Helen G. Downs. The company was a sugar broker which also, as in this case, bought and
sold for its own account.
4. Resolution No. 1, Aug. 6, 1960, issued pursuant to Law of Nationalization No. 851,
July 6, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as Law 851]. For an English translation of Law 851, see
32 U.S.L. Week at 4229-30. See text accompanying note 21 infra.
5. The American courts found that promises for compensation were illusory.
6. There were two presentations of the draft with bills of lading attached. The claim
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The broker-dealer did not pay the draft when presented but retained
the bills of lading attached. These it negotiated, receiving payment from
its Moroccan customers, who, in possession of the bills of lading, could
obtain delivery of the sugar on arrival of the ship. After some little delay,
the broker-dealer returned the upaid draft to the presenting bank but
later paid the purchase price of the sugar to Peter L. F. Sabbatino, a
receiver appointed in New York for the New York assets of the sugar
company. Not only had the company asserted its claim against the broker-
dealer if it paid the draft to the representative of Cuba, but the sugar
company also had offered inducements to the broker-dealer to pay the
price of the sugar to it or its receiver, and agreed to indemnify the
broker-dealer against any loss it might suffer (1) in withholding pay-
ment from the collecting bank until it was directed by a court order whom
to pay and (2) in making payment to the receiver. The sugar company
agreed to pay the broker-dealer ten per cent of the purchase price of the
sugar in the event of a final favorable determination of the right of the
sugar company to secure and retain the purchase price. The sugar com-
pany also obtained a state court order from a New York court directing
payment by the broker-dealer to the receiver, thus confirming the
propriety of the payment as part of the New York assets of the sugar
company.
The Cuban Government, not having received payment for the sugar
from the broker-dealer, then by its agent, the Banco Nacional de Cuba,
began an action in conversion against the broker-dealer alleging that the
broker-dealer, in retaining and negotiating the bills of lading on pre-
sentment of these documents with draft attached and returning the
unpaid draft, was liable for damages for its wrongful act. The receiver
was made a party to this action as having illegally received the proceeds
of the conversion and was enjoined from disposing of the money he had
received.7
by the sugar company against the broker was received the day of the first presentation. All
documents were returned by the broker-dealer to the presenting bank on the ground there
was a document missing. A few days later the second presentation was made with all
necessary documents attached. 307 F.2d at 850-51.
7. The facts are condensed from the statements in the opinions. The plaintiff, Banco
Nacional de Cuba (State Bank of Cuba), had received by assignment the draft and bill
of lading from the Banco Para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba, which as agent for the
Cuban Government had made the second contract with the broker-dealer. The documents
were delivered to the Soci6t6 G~n6ral of France for presentment to the purchaser in New
York. There were two defendants-the purchaser of the sugar, and Peter L. F. Sabbatino,
who bad been appointed a receiver for the New York assets of the sugar company. The
original contract for the purchase of the sugar was between the broker-dealer and General
Sugar Estates, Inc., a wholly owned subsidiary of Compania Azucarera *Vertientes-Camaguey
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The decision of the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York was in favor of the receiver of the sugar company
and supported the company's contention as to its continuing title to that
shipload of sugar as a part of its assets in Cuba. However, in upholding
the sugar company's claim to title, the lower court rejected as unsound
the reasons advanced by the sugar company in support of that claim.
Then, on a theory of law not argued by the sugar company, the district
court found that the sugar company had title-that it had never lost
title-since the decree of Cuba and the seizure of assets without com-
pensation under the decree, particularly when coupled with the fact that
these actions were directed solely against United States citizens in retalia-
tion for reduction of the sugar quota by the United States, were contrary
to international law and therefore not valid to transfer title to Cuba.8
This decision was affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit; 9 and the case, on a petition for a writ of certiorari, came
before the United States Supreme Court. On a request by the Supreme
Court that the United States Department of State express its views as to
the desirability of granting a writ, the Government, by the Department
of Justice, urged that the case be reviewed, involving as it did the validity
(i.e., the transfer of title as intended by Cuban law and seizure under that
law) of the acts of a sovereign within its own territory.10 The writ of
certiorari was granted."
By the time of the argument in the United States Supreme Court the
receivership of the sugar company had been dissolved" and a motion,
then pending undetermined, had been made in that Court to substitute the
sugar company for the receiver;' 3 and the purchase price of the sugar
(the face amount of the draft) was being held in escrow in New York
de Cuba. The latter, referred to here as the sugar company and identified in the court's
opinion as C.AN., was recognized as the real party in interest. 307 F.2d at 850.
8. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 193 F. Supp. 375 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
9. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 307 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1962).
10. The State Department denied that it had ever communicated to the courts any
indication that in its opinion the courts were free to pass upon the validity of an act of
state of Cuba. Brief for the State Dep't, pp. 6-7. The United States Court of Appeals had
stated that it had been enlightened by the State Department in this particular. 307 F.2d
at 858-60.
11. 372 U.S. 905 (1963).
12. Schwartz v. Compania Azucarera-Camaguey de Cuba, 39 Misc. 2d 63, 70-71, 240
N.Y.S.2d 247, 254-55 (Sup. CL 1962).
13. 374 U.S. 820 (1963). The United States Supreme Court denied this motion, saying
in its opinion: "Accordingly, we are constrained to deny C. A. V.'s motion to be admitted
as a party, without prejudice however to the renewal of such a motion in the lower
courts if it appears that C. A. V.'s interests are not adequately represented by Farr, Whit-
lock and that the granting of such a motion will not disturb federal jurisdiction." Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 32 U.S.L. Week at 4231.
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awaiting decision of the Supreme Court determining which adverse
claimant-Cuba or the sugar company-had title to the goods.' 4 Cuba
claimed the sugar by nationalization decree and seizure of all assets of the
sugar company including that sugar which was in Cuba at the time of the
seizure. Cuba claimed it took title to the assets by this "act of state." The
sugar company which had produced the sugar and had executed the
original contract of sale claimed it was the continuing owner of the
sugar, and that the confiscation decree and seizure did not deprive it of
title, though obviously that act by Cuba did render the company unable
to deliver the sugar. 5
II. "-OF IMMEDIATE OVERWHELMING INTEREST-":
THE WORSENING RELATIONS BETWEEN
THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA
Some believe that Fidel Castro Ruz (the full name which he signs as
prime minister) was a dedicated Communist long before he organized the
Cuban revolution, and that he planned as its successful conclusion com-
munization of the country. For the debacle in Cuba they seek to blame
someone-the State Department, the newspapers, the C.I.A.-for igno-
rance and lack of foresight. Others believe that Castro never had any
basic conviction, that he was a rebel against society, a man of violence,
an opportunist, and that the imposition of Communism on hapless Cuba
was the unplanned result of a violent and reckless path to political power,
and that others guided the revolutionary forces-some consciously, some
perhaps unconsciously-to that end.
History will trace the course more clearly, no doubt, but at least com-
munist dialectic did not immediately appear with the success of the
revolution. Nor was it until December 1, 1961, that Castro admitted that
he was and had been a Marxist.
On January 7, 1959, the United States recognized the Castro Govern-
ment as the Government of Cuba, de jure and de facto."' On February 7,
1959, the Castro Government published an amended version of certain
sections of the "Fundamental Law of Cuba." Except for certain bitter
statements concerning the head of the previous government whom Castro
had displaced, the document was a declaration of political and economic
rights, particularly of the right of private property. Of immediate interest
to Americans was Article 24,1' which stated a respect for private property,
14. Ibid.
15. Cuba had refused clearance to the sugar-laden ship until the broker-dealer had
signed the second contract. 307 F.2d at 850.
16. 40 Dep't State Bull. 128 (1959).
17. Article 24, published in English in 1959 by Gen. Legal Div., Pan Am. Union, Dep't
of Legal Affairs, under the authority of the Pan Am. Union, Gen. Secretariat, 0. A. S.,
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and declared that property taken for a public purpose would be paid for
at appropriate value and that the Cuban courts were prepared to grant
judicial relief when needed to property owners. The lack of substantial
change in the fundamental law of Cuba partially allayed misgivings-but
not for long. In sequence came the Agrarian Reform Law, May 17, 1959;
the Labor Law, November 24, 1959; a third law known by its number,
Law 851, of July 6, 1960, now referred to as the "Nationalization Law"
under which finally all American property (including the sugar company
in this case) was nationalized; and a fourth law known also by its
number, Law 890, of October 13, 1960, which nationalized many Cuban
companies, in some of which there was American interest.
When the first of these laws was passed-the Agrarian Reform Law-
some fear was felt as to its intention, but the American people were
informed that it was fashioned upon the land reform laws put in force in
Japan and Korea during the regime of General MacArthur. Many
Americans, including some with heavy national commitments in Cuba,
believed that land reform was desirable, was necessary, and expressed but
little concern if they did not actually approve. Whatever the merits or
demerits of the law itself might have been, the method of its imposition
gave immediate cause for alarm. It is sufficient to say that from its incep-
tion it was used as an engine of oppression, as an excuse for confiscation,
and for the destruction or lessening of value of private holdings in Cuba.
Immediately the Cuban courts were filled with complaints of the uncon-
scionable acts of the agents of the Castro Government, but soon the
hopeful litigants found there was little relief to be had in the Cuban
courts. Then less than a year after its passage and before the outright
confiscatory laws were passed, our State Department protested, saying
in part:
The actions in question involve principally the seizure and occupation of land and
buildings of United States citizens without court orders and frequently without any
written authorization whatever, the confiscation and removal of equipment, the
seizure of cattle, the cutting and removal of timber, the plowing under of pastures,
all without the consent of the American owners. In many cases no inventories were
taken nor were any receipts proffered nor any indication afforded that payment was
intended to be made. These acts have been carried out in the name of the National
Agrarian Reform Institute....
The United States Government in its notes of June 11 and October 12, 1959, to
Wash., D.C., reads in part as follows: "Confiscation of property is prohibited; but is
authorized for the property of the Tyrant . . . . No other natural or juridical person
can be deprived of his property except by competent judicial authority and for a justifiable
reason of public benefit or social interest and always after payment of appropriate com-
pensation in cash, fixed by court action .... " In spite of these apparent assurances, the
later confiscations were purportedly made in accordance with this section of the Funda-
mental Law.
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the Government of Cuba expressed its full support of soundly conceived programs
for rural betterment, including land reform. This support has been demonstrated by
United States assistance given such programs in many countries.18
Among the effects not intended by the Castro Government but never-
theless soon apparent was the crippling blow to the efficiency of sugar
production, the great money crop of Cuba. Within a year that great
industry showed disorganization, and sugar production experienced a
significant decline. The United States had already recognized this danger
and pointed out to Cuba in a friendly note that "a widespread redistribu-
tion of land in a manner which might have serious adverse effects on
productivity could prove harmful to the general economy . . . . MD But
Cuba ignored protest, advice or suggestion. It announced a policy of
diversification of industry and less dependence upon its great money crop,
sugar. It turned to greater reliance on Russia and planned for increased
trade with that Communist country. Fearing that the pledge of so much
sugar to Russia, with declining production of sugar in Cuba, might cause
Cuba to default on its quota to the United States, Congress granted to the
President of the United States the power to reduce the sugar quota of
Cuba. This the President did on July 6, 1960, saying:
The Government of Cuba has committed itself to purchase substantial quantities
of goods from the Soviet Union under barter arrangements. It has chosen to under-
take to pay for these goods with sugar-traded at prices well below those which it
has obtained in the United States. The inescapable conclusion is that Cuba has
embarked on a course of action to commit steadily increasing amounts of its sugar
crop to trade with the Communist bloc, thus making its future ability to fill the
sugar needs of the United States ever more uncertain. 20
On the same day the President made this statement, the Cuban Govern-
ment promulgated the above-mentioned bitterly anti-American, violently
worded confiscatory Law 851. This was the Cuban retaliatory answer
to the American reduction of the sugar quota. It was so stated in the law
of Cuba and was so found both by the district court and the circuit court
in Sabbatino.
One month to a day after this law was promulgated by decree, Reso-
lution Number One, under that law, was approved. The resolution listed
some twenty-six companies: several public utilities, a few branches of
American oil companies and a score of sugar companies, in all of which
Americans had an interest; these were marked out for nationalization.
From that time on, under Cuban law, the Cuban Government was the
owner of all Cuban assets of all the twenty-six companies named and
assumed all the liabilities of each. The assets of all these seized properties
18. 42 Dep't State Bull. 158 (1960).
19. 40 id. 958 (1959).
20. 43 id. 140 (1960) (White House Press Release).
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were operated as part of the national economy for the benefit of the
State.2 '
III. "'-VHAT PREVIOUSLY WAS CLEAR-": THE ACT OF STATE DocTRNmE
Since the founding of the Republic, the United States has respected
the act of state doctrine. In Sabbatino for the first time in the history of
America, it seemed to the district court and the court of appeals that
this well-settled principle of law was inadequate. Not only was it made
to bend; it was abolished. Then the Supreme Court of the United States
restored it.
What is an "act of state" and what is the "act of state doctrine"?
An "act of state" is exactly what the words describe and imply. It is
the imposition of the national will upon men and property within the
national domain. Any law, customary or statutory, enforced in any coun-
try is an "act of state." An "act of state" is this; it is nothing more.
The "act of state doctrine" is the recognition by a country of the legal
and physical consequences of all acts of state in other countries. The
doctrine recognizes the attributes and prerogatives of sovereignty. It
recognizes that the world is composed of independent sovereigns, the
sovereign power of each of which is exclusive within its own national
territory. There "the decree of the sovereign makes law."22 The doctrine
is a working rule of conflict of laws: each country recognizes and accepts
as accomplished the effect imposed by every other sovereign on property
and persons within that sovereign's jurisdiction. The doctrine is recip-
rocal: each nation does this in respect of every other so that all nations
will recognize the independence and sovereignty of each.
An act of state is an exemplification of the right to govern; the act
of state doctrine, a foreign sovereign's recognition of that right. An
21. Two further resolutions under this same law followed: Resolution No. 2 of Sept.
17, 1960, nationalized the branches of the three American banks doing business in Cuba;
Resolution No. 3 of Oct. 24, 1960, nationalized a large number of corporations in which
Americans had an interest. Most of the facilities of the American oil companies were not
seized under this law and the Resolutions, but their facilities were taken by intervention
because they had refused to refine Russian crude oil. The treatment the oil companies
received was also the subject of a diplomatic protest as had been the seizures of other com-
panies under Law 851. The last of these infamous four laws, Expropriation and Nationaliza-
tion of Industrial and Commercial Enterprises Law No. 890 of Oct. 13, 1960, took over a
majority of the remaining privately-owned businesses, mostly Cuban, but with some Amer-
ican interest. The Ministry of Labor Law No. 647 of Nov. 24, 1959, was invoked less fre-
quently against foreigners than against Cuban businesses but tended to make business un-
profitable by increasing cost and ultimately had the same effect as nationalization.
22. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 358 (1909). See also
Sabbatino, 307 F.2d at 854: "Under the ordinary rules of conflict of laws, title to this
sugar would be determined by the Law of Cuba, namely, the decree of expropriation of
August 6, 1960."
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act of state may be just or unjust to another country or that country's
citizens whose persons or property are within its jurisdiction. If the act
of state violates the code of conduct which a country should maintain
toward another country and its nationals, it is in violation of "interna-
tional law." Then the offending country becomes liable. Nevertheless it
is an act of state and other countries must recognize its effectiveness on
men and property within that country's jurisdiction.
The courts of the United States
have repeatedly declared for over a period of at least thirty years, that a court of
the forum will not undertake to pass upon the validity under the municipal law of
another state of the acts of officials of that state, purporting to act as such.25
Simple as is the concept of act of state and understandable the prac-
tical reasons for the act of state doctrine, both terms seem to be subject
to much misunderstanding. The conditions which must exist before one
country will recognize an act of state have been defined both judicially
and by the Department of State. It is also important to determine what
is not an act of state.
1. An act of state is a sovereign act by an established government.
The act of state doctrine is applied by the courts of one country, only
to governmental or official acts of a country which is recognized polit-
ically as a country under one government. Sometimes when a revolution
is in progress, the opposing parties each claim to be the sole legitimate
government. It is United States policy to give recognition only when one
group clearly appears to be the sole governing organization in physical
control of the country, capable of maintaining order and of fulfilling the
nation's international obligations.
It is idle to argue that the proceedings of those who thus triumphed [in revolution]
should be treated as the acts of banditti or mere mobs.24
It is also the result of the interpretation by this [Supreme] court of the principles
of international law that when a government which originates in revolution or revolt
is recognized by the political department of our govenment as the de jure govern-
ment of the country in which it is established, such recognition is retroactive in
effect and validates all the actions and conduct of the government so recognized
from the commencement of its existence.2 5
2. Official recognition by the State Department is conclusive evidence
of the establishment of a government. Some courts have extended the
23. Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Fr~res Soci&6t Anonyme, 163 F.2d 246, 249 (2d Cir.)
(L. Hand, J.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 772 (1947). See Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246
U.S. 297, 303 (1918); Ricaud v. American Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304, 310 (1918). As the
court of appeals and the Supreme Court pointed out in Sabbatino, the doctrine dates back
to even earlier cases. 307 F.2d at 855-56; 32 U.S.L. Week at 4234.
24. Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 253 (1897).
25. Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302-03 (1918).
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doctrine to recognize the acts of state of a firmly established de facto
government not'yet recognized by the State Department as the de fire
government. A country does not become "unrecognized" or a government
"unestablished" merely because it becomes unfriendly. The withdrawal
of diplomatic representatives does not withdraw recognition. The State
Department, in answer to inquiry about this matter, said:
Although the United States has severed diplomatic relations with Cuba, it has not
withdrawn recognition from the Castro Government as the government of Cuba.
Consequently, the Government of Cuba can sue or be sued in the United States
courts on the same basis as any other Government.20
The United States Supreme Court in the Sabbatino case said:
We hold that this petitioner is not barred from access to the federal courts.
3. The act of state doctrine is a rule of judicial decision. Courts of
one country will accept as "valid" an act of state of any other country
whose government is recognized as the sole and independent government
of that country. The only proof to be accepted by the court of one coun-
try of the act of state of another relates to the facts and not to the
validity-i.e., what the law of that country is, the official meaning given
by that country, and how the law has been applied and the results
achieved as to the persons or property whose interest is before the court.
The validity of an act of state must be accepted once this evidence is
presented, since, in the words of the Supreme Court, in an older case,
to permit the validity of the acts of one sovereign state to be reexamined and per-
haps condemned by the courts of another would very certainly "imperil the amicable
relations between governments and vex the peace of nations."2 8
4. The act of state doctrine is a doctrine of expedience, necessary in
international relations. It recognizes that the courts of one country lack
power to reverse or alter the consequences of acts committed by foreign
sovereigns in their own territory. The doctrine should not be confused
with the doctrine of "sovereign immunity," i.e., the immunity from judi-
cial decision, granted under certain conditions to foreign sovereigns in
our courts or those of other countries. The connection of the act of state
doctrine with sovereignty is merely that each sovereign claims exclusive
jurisdiction over persons and property, citizens or aliens within its juris-
diction and reciprocally must recognize this same exclusive jurisdiction
to all other independent sovereigns.
The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory, is necessarily exclusive and
26. Letter from Department of State, June 28, 1962, on file in the Office of the Legal
Advisor, Department of State, in 57 Am. J. Int'l L. 409, 410 (1963).
27. 32 U.S.L. Week at 4233.
28. Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 304 (1918).
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absolute; it is susceptible of no limitation, not imposed by itself. Any restriction
upon it, deriving validity from an external source, would imply a diminution of its
sovereignty, to the extent of the restriction, and an investment of that sovereignty,
to the same extent, in that power which could impose such restriction.29
5. "Recognition" of an act of state of a foreign state is limited to a
recognition of the effect of an act of state within the national jurisdiction
of that foreign state. Since every sovereign jealously guards its own sov-
ereign prerogatives, an act of state is strictly and narrowly confined.
(a) An act of state has no extraterritorial effect. For one nation to
commit an act of state which is intended to affect property within another
country would be to endeavor to limit the sovereignty of that other coun-
try over property within its own national jurisdiction. Neither can an act
of state affect the liberties of persons within the jurisdiction of another
sovereign. If, however, an act of state is compatible with the laws and
morality of another state, extraterritorial effect may be given as a matter
of international courtesy. One state may then by comity adopt the act
of state of the other country and enforce or apply it within its own terri-
tory.
The comity thus extended to other nations, is no impeachment of sovereignty. It is
the voluntary act of the nation by which it is offered; and is inadmissible, when
contrary to its policy, or prejudicial to its interests.30
In most cases the laws are compatible; but if they are not, then a foreign
act of state can have extraterritorial effect on property only by treaty
or executive agreement."
Laws have no force of themselves beyond the jurisdiction of the State which enacts
them, and can have extra-territorial effect only by the comity of other States.32
These principles require that, in cases of other than penal actions, the foreign law,
if not contrary to our public policy, or to abstract justice or pure morals, or cal-
culated to injure the State or its citizens, shall be recognized and enforced here, if
we have jurisdiction of all necessary parties, and if we can see that, consistently
with our own forms of procedure and law of trials, we can do substantial justice
between the parties.83
29. The Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 135 (1812).
30. Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 589 (1839).
31. See United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942), which concerned itself with the
Litvinoff Assignment, under which the United States permitted the application of Russia's
confiscatory laws to property which Russian corporations had placed within the juris-
diction of the United States. Prior to this agreement, American courts had consistently
refused to apply the confiscatory laws to any property whatever within the jurisdiction of
the United States which was continuously held to be property of those Russian corporations,
even though they had been nationalized within the country of origin. But political refugees
have never been returned to the country which has sought them.
32. Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 669 (1892).
33. Higgins v. Central New England & West. R.R., 155 Mass. 176, 180 (1892), quoted
with approval in Huntington v. Attrill, supra note 32, at 675-76.
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(b) Possession or control of the property affected or person accused
is a condition for foreign recognition of the completed act of state. Not
only does an act of state apply only to persons and property within a
country's jurisdiction, but the act of state must be completed by posses-
sion of the property or control over the person. Although a state may
intend to confiscate the property, or to seize and punish persons not in
sympathy with its principles, if this property or these persons are not
seized or physically controlled, there is no act of state committed or com-
pleted in respect to them. On this matter, Mr. Chief Justice Marshall, in
Rose v. Himely,34 said:
The great question to be decided is-Was this sentence pronounced by a court of
competent jurisdiction?
At the threshold of this interesting inquiry, a difficulty presents itself, which is of
no inconsiderable magnitude. It is this:---Can this court examine the jurisdiction
of a foreign tribunal?35
The Supreme Court there found that an act of state by a French court
had not transferred title to a ship, since the vessel was not in the area
over which the French court had jurisdiction. The foreign court having
pronounced a worthless decree of condemnation, one it could not enforce
as it had no control over ship or cargo, the Court held:
The sentence of condemnation being considered as null and invalid, the property is
unchanged, and therefore, ought to be recovered by the libellants in the court below.3
The essentials for a valid or executed act of state, i.e., jurisdiction and
both initial and continuing possession, are well illustrated in a much later
French case. Here, the Soviet Ambassador to France asked the French
courts to put him, as representative of the U.S.S.R., in possession of
certain ships in a French port. He claimed title to these ships under a
U.S.S.R. decree of January 26, 1918, which had nationalized the merchant
marine of which these ships had been a part.
However, these particular ships were the property of an organization
known as La Ropit and had been based at Odessa. At the date of the
U.S.S.R. decree and thereafter, until April 1919, the U.S.S.R. had never
exercised any governmental authority whatever over Odessa and its sur-
rounding area. In April 1919 the Ukrainian Soviet (which later became
part of the U.S.S.R.) gained governmental control of the Odessa area.
But by that time these ships were no longer there nor in any other terri-
torial waters of the U.S.S.R., and never returned to such jurisdiction.
The ships had been seized once at Odessa by a short-lived local govern-
ment (unconnected with the forces which later became the U.S.S.R.). But
34. 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 241 (1808).
35. Id. at 268.
36. Id. at 281.
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a succeeding government (Austrian) had returned the ships to the La
Ropit organization. The ships thereupon left the Odessa area before the
control of this area passed to the Ukrainian Soviet. Under the La Ropit
organization (which had then been dissolved in Russia) the ships arrived
in France.
Under these circumstances, the courts in France refused to dispossess
La Ropit owners and thus refused to enforce the confiscation decree extra-
territorially as the U.S.S.R. Ambassador had requested.87
The same reasoning applies to property which has been in possession
of a foreign government but has escaped and arrived in another country
in control of its original owners.
Re-capture, escape, or a voluntary discharge of the captured vessel, would be such a
circumstance, because the sovereign would be thereby deprived of the possession of
the thing, and of his power over it. While this possession remains, the res may be
either restored or sold, the sentence of the court can be executed, and therefore
this possession seems to be the essential fact on which the jurisdiction of the court
depends. 38
"Recapture" applies more aptly to ships than to other types of property
and implies some type of international hostility or at least intervention on
behalf of the "recaptured" property. However, the situations described
and the quotations from these older cases illustrate the two factors which
must exist before there is a fully completed or executed act of state which
would be recognized as "valid" in other countries.
In the Sabbatino case the Supreme Court of the United States frowned
upon self-help, indicating that any interpretation which would "sanction
self-help remedies [is] something hardly conducive to a peaceful interna-
tional order."39 A desire to avoid a disturbance of peaceful international
order seems a normal application of the rule that self-help may not prop-
erly be exercised in a manner to create a breach of the peace. A narrowing
of the area in which self-help may be proper has been concurrent with
the rise of civil facilities for adjudicating grievances, these facilities
37. Union des R~publiques Socialistes Soviftiques v. Intendant G~nral Bourgeois es-
Qualit6 et Socit6 la Ropit, Cour de Cassation (Ch. req.), Mar. 5, 1928, [1928] Sirey Recuell
Gnral I. 217 (Fr.), [1927-19281 Ann. Dig. 67 (No. 43). For a complete statement of the
facts underlying the La Ropit case, see The Jupiter, [1924] P. 236 (C.A.); The Jupiter
(No. 2), [1925] P. 69 (CA.); The Jupiter (No. 3), [19271 P. 122, appeal dismissed,
[1927] P. 250 (CA.). These cases, which concerned another of the La Ropit ships which
had escaped under the same conditions, are summarized in [1925-1926] Ann. Dig. 136 (No.
100). Cf. Compania Espanola de Navegacion Maritima, SA., v. The Navemar, 303 U.S. 68,
75-76, & 76 n.1 (concerning Jupiter] (1938), and subsequent decisions in the same case, 24
F. Supp. 495 (E.D.N.Y. 1938) and 102 F.2d 444 (2d Cir. 1939). Issues became moot by
recognition of different Spanish government and return of ship to private ownership. 103
F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1939).
38. Hudson v. Guestier, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 293, 294 (1808).
39. 32 U.S.L. Week at 4240.
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making self-help unnecessary. The international field, however, still lacks
universally recognized, well-organized methods for settling international
disputes and it is therefore not presumed that the United States Supreme
Court in the Sabbatino case intended to prevent an American victim of a
foreign confiscation from using means available to him within the exploit-
ing country (where no redress could be obtained) of avoiding execution
of an act of state upon his property there or to prevent him from com-
pensating or mitigating his losses within the United States by all peaceful,
legal and customary means.
(c) "Recognition" of an act of state by a foreign country must not
be confused with "enforcement" within that country. No country will
"enforce" an act of state of another country if that act of state is in-
compatible with its own laws, but it will recognize the validity of the
foreign law within that foreign country.
As for the very obnoxious and offensive character of the German decrees, the court
is obliged to hold that governing law is no less controlling because it is bad law.
The plaintiffs shift the point when they argue that our courts will not enforce
foreign law contrary to our own public policy. This is not a case of enforcing
German law here but rather of necessarily recognizing the force of German law in
Germany. Certainly, our courts would not enforce the German law by applying it
to the assets of these plaintiffs in this country, but we cannot undo or set at naught
what has been done by the German Government with the assets of the parties in
Germany.40
The Supreme Court in Sabbatino made this principle conclusive:
However offensive to the public policy of this country and its constituent states
an expropriation of this kind may be, we conclude that both the national interest
and progress towards the goal of establishing the rule of law among nations are
best served by maintaining intact the act of state doctrine in this realm of its
application. 41
(d) An act of state must be recognized as to all property brought into
a foreign country, provided only at the time of entry and adjudication
it is still in the custody or control of the person or entity which acquired
title by act of state or of the successor of such a person.
The principle that the conduct of one independent government cannot be success-
fully questioned in the courts of another is as applicable to a case involving the
title to property brought within the custody of a court, such as we have here, as
it was held to be to the cases cited, in which claims for damages were based upon
acts done in a foreign country, for it rests at last upon the highest considerations of
international comity and expediency.42
40. Kleve v. Basler Lebens-Versicherungs-Geselschaft, 182 Misc. 776, 782, 45 N.Y.S.2d
882, 887 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
41. 32 U.S.L. Week at 4240.
42. Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 303-04 (1918).
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(e) Recognition of the validity of an act of state does not admit that
the act was fair, equitable, or in accord with the principles of interna-
national law; nor does it relieve the sovereign committing the act from
liability to any alien for seizure of, or injury to, his property, or from
the obligation to make compensation to such an alien for wrongful im-
prisonment or to his heirs for wrongful death."
The act of state doctrine is based upon an awareness that men and
nations sometimes fail in their responsibilities to other men and nations.
Both fall short of the standards of conduct that each should observe
to all.
We ought not, therefore, to separate the science of public law from that of
ethics, nor encourage the dangerous suggestion that governments are not so strictly
bound by the obligations of truth, justice and humanity, in relation to other powers,
as they are in the management of their own local concerns. States, or bodies politic,
are to be considered as moral persons, having a public will, capable and free to do
right and wrong.44
When a government does a wrong to its own citizens, they have no
redress except through their own courts.4 But when a government does
a wrong to another country or to the citizens of that other country, and
the wrong is not corrected by the courts of the country which committed
the wrong, the persons wronged can appeal to their own government. If
their government is convinced its own citizens have been wronged, a
demand for redress will be made to the delinquent country. For property
seized from its citizens abroad the United States expects prompt, adequate
and effective compensation.
Property of nationals and companies of either Party shall not be taken within the
territories of the other Party except for public benefit, nor shall it be taken without.
the prompt payment of just compensation. Such compensation shall be in an
effectively realizable form and shall represent the full equivalent of the property
taken; and adequate provision shall have been made at or prior to the time of
taking for the determination and payment thereof.46
Expropriation, confiscation or conversion of personal property, expro-
priation of real property, collecting of outstanding obligations which were
due to the American companies when seized, breach of contract-by
whatever legal designation they were called, the acts of Cuba against
Americans and their property created obligations, ascertainable in
amount, for which Cuba became liable. In Sabbatino itself, the court of
43. One government is liable to the citizens of another only if (1) its own courts fait
to give redress, and (2) the claim is sponsored by the government of the citizen.
44. 1 Kent, Commentaries on American Law 3 (8th ed. 1854).
45. In rare cases, a Legislature may give relief by a private bill.
46. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation with Greece, Aug. 3, 1951, art.
VII, para. 3, [1954] 2 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 1829, T.I.A.S. No. 3057.
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appeals, while objecting to the purpose for which the property was taken
-retaliation-and to the fact that the act of state was directed only
against United States nationals-discrimination-nevertheless admitted
that
if there had been adequate compensation for the seizure, regardless of the other
circumstances surrounding the expropriations, it would be very difficult to find any
violation of international law.47
IV. COMPONENT PARTS OF AN ACT OF STATE
The method of imposing a governing will on men, land and things must
follow the same three steps no matter how great or how small is the
governing body which performs the act. In this, an "act of a municipal-
ity" in passing and enforcing city ordinances is no different from that
of a recognized sovereign in creating an act of state. The three steps are:
1. Creation and publication of the national intention,
2. Physical imposition of the national intention upon persons or prop-
erty, and
3. The judicial confirmation.
A. Creation and Publication of the National Intention
The determination and announcement of the national intention, or the
goal to be achieved, is the first step. This is usually but not always ex-
pressed by legislation. It was by legislation in the Sabbatino case: Decree
Law 851 and the three resolutions under it left no doubt that it was the
intention of Cuba to seize all property of Americans, dispossess all Amer-
ican managements, transfer title to itself, assume liabilities and thereafter
to liquidate or operate the seized assets as part of the nation's business.
B. Physical Imposition of the National Intention Upon
Persons or Property
The mere publication of national intent does not of itself create the
harm or damage, although this expressed intention may reduce the value
of property in anticipation of additional taxes, fines or its actual seizure.
Announcement of national intention may cause persons to flee in fear
that this now expressed purpose may create damage or death. But it is
the imposition of the national intention that causes damage. So in the
Sabbatino case, although the intention to seize all American-owned prop-
erties had been expressed by the passage of the law on July 6, 1960, one
month later the sugar company, as yet unharmed by Law 851, began
fulfilling its outstanding contract by commencing the loading of a ship
with sugar, which operation was interrupted by the physical seizure of
47. 307 F.2d at 862 n.9.
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its assets-the imposition of the national will. If the seizure is not under
a law, the national intention may be often expressed by the ratification
of an act which was unauthorized when committed. When ratified, how-
ever, the seizure becomes the physical imposition of the national will.
The adoption by the United States of the wrongful act of an officer is of course an
adoption of the act when and as committed, and causes such act of the officer to
be, in virtue of the statute, a rightful appropriation by the Government, for which
compensation is provided.48
The fact is unimportant that the taking was tortious in its origin, if it was made
lawful by relation. 49
C. The Judicial Confirmation
The confirmation is by the courts. While they are open and functioning,
they will determine what are the limits of the national intention and
whether or not the physical acts perpetrated are within that national
intention. If damage has been created not compatible with national in-
tention, courts of most modern states will give redress. But if the damage
is within the national intent, no relief will be granted, and in either case
the national will is defined and confirmed. In the case of revolutions and
accusations against persons, it is frequently the court which, by its con-
donation of acts against property or of a sentence of incarceration or
death, announces that the act committed or about to be committed is
within the national intent. For this reason it has long been the established
rule that no diplomatic claim exists in behalf of a citizen against a foreign
country until all legal remedies available in that country have been ex-
hausted and the citizen has not had redress for his loss or damage. But
neither this country nor any other demands the impossible, and in place
of an adverse decision of a court, will accept proof that no redress could
be found in the courts of that foreign country or that it might be physi-
cally dangerous to try.
[Tihere was practically no appeal in these cases except to the department of Loire-
Inferieure; in the then existing state of bad feeling and modified hostilities, and
under the surrounding circumstances, this was to the captains of the seized vessels,
in most if not all cases, a physical impossibility. Nor prior to the agreement of
1800 was there any practical reason for appealing to a court when the result, as
our seamen believed, whether rightly or not, but still honestly, was a foregone con-
clusion, and while negotiations were progressing for a settlement; nor is there any-
thing in these negotiations showing that a technical exhaustion of legal remedy
would be required. We are of opinion that the claimant was not, under these purely
exceptional circumstances, obliged to prosecute his case through the highest court,
even if he could have done so, which we doubt.59
48. Crozier v. Friedrich Krupp Aktiengesellschaft, 224 U.S. 290, 305 (1912).
49. Shoshone Tribe v. United States, 299 U.S. 476, 496 (1937).
50. Gray v. United States, 21 Ct. Cl. 340, 402-03 (1886).
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In the Sabbatino case, however, it is not necessary to rely on an
assumption concerning judicial confirmation that under the law of Cuba
the assets of the sugar company had been vested in the Government which
held title to them. At the time of the seizure, there was pending before
an appropriate Cuban court a complaint by the sugar company that it
had been wrongfully deprived of certain of its property under the Agra-
rian Reform Law. After seizure of its properties under the later enacted
nationalization law (No. 851), the pending action was dismissed by the
court, on the ground that all property formerly belonging to the sugar
company was now the property of the State.5 Law 851 provided there
should be no review by the Cuban courts. This was the judicial confirma-
tion and made complete the act of state.
A claimant in a foreign state is not required to exhaust justice in such state when
there is no justice to exhaust. 52
V. "RECOGNITION" AND "ENFORCEMENT": PRECISE
MEANINGS ESSENTIAL
You see it's like a portmanteau-there are two meanings packed up into one word.
Alice Through the Looking Glass5a
There can be more than one meaning to the word "recognition" and
more than one meaning to the word "enforcement" when used in connec-
tion with an act of state. Through the words we must seek the concept.
A. Recognition
1. First Meaning
When any allegation is made in any action that some foreign law is
relevant to the case, the first objective is to determine what are the terms
of that foreign law and secondly if the particular property under con-
sideration has been affected by that law. Only thus-by analyzing the
law-of-the-place-where, lex loci-may a court in the first instance recog-
nize what is an act of state and whether or not that law must be an
integral part of the issues to be considered in the case. This is "recogni-
tion" of a fact: the fact of the existence, meaning and application of
the foreign law.54
51. See Schwartz v. Compania Azucarera-Carnaguey de Cuba, 39 Misc. 2d 63, 70-71,
240 N.Y.S.2d 247, 254-55 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
52. Cushing v. United States, 22 Ct. C1. 1, 40 (1886). See also 6 Moore, Digest of In-
ternational Law § 988, at 677 (1906).
53. Carroll, Alice Through the Looking Glass 74 (New York: McLoughlin Bros. 1872).
54. See generally Sommerich & Busch, Foreign Law: A Guide to Pleading & Proof
(1959).
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2. Second Meaning
The second meaning of recognition is the basis for the act of state
doctrine. The law of the foreign jurisdiction is "recognized" as the "law
of the case" insofar as it has affected persons and property which have
been fully subjected to that law and its execution in the foreign country-
whatever has been subjected to a completed act of state. This recognition
is not difficult or unusual and causes no comments when the law is not
incompatible with American law. The act of state doctrine is significant
only when the law differs and our courts must recognize as the law of
the case a circumstance which creates a legal conclusion, an economic
result which would have been different if the property in question had
been subjected only to our laws and procedures instead of that of the
foreign country. This is recognition by our courts of the foreign law
and procedures as a completed act of state.
B. Enforcement
1. First Meaning
The enforcement of an act of state by the courts of the United States
differs from a recognition of an act of state in that the very term implies
that the court is asked to take an active participation in applying the
foreign act of state. Enforcement assumes that the property before the
court has not been subjected to the foreign law, that the foreign country
itself has not enforced its own national intention. If the property in
question has not been under the jurisdiction of the foreign state, so that
the state could not enforce its own decrees, the United States will enforce
them if at all only by comity, and then, of course, only if that foreign
act of state is compatible with our own laws. If not compatible, the
United States court will not enforce.
2. Second Meaning
When property, which has been within a country that has purported
to subject such property to an act of state, enters the United States and
some action is before a court in respect to it, the relief requested, what-
ever form that request may take, may be either recognition of a foreign
act of state or enforcement of that foreign act of state. The two words
are very apt to be confused. If the court should find that the property
was wholly and completely subjected to the act of state and if the in-
tended effect was a change of title in that foreign country, and the prop-
erty is in possession and control of the one (or someone claiming under
him) who acquired title in that foreign country, the relief asked is merely
"recognition," a confirmation of a result accomplished in another country.
But if the evidence shows no subjection in the foreign country, or that
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the property is not in the possession or control of the person who acquired
title in that foreign country, then the relief asked for would be "enforce-
ment'--i.e., completing the uncompleted act of state, or dispossessing
someone to place possession in the hands of the titled claimant under
the act of state.
VI. REPRISE
A. The Parties to the Sabbatino Case and What Rack Wanted
as the Case Came Before the Lower Courts
It is necessary to keep in mind the parties before the lower courts,
what were the facts, and on those facts what each party asked the courts
to do for it or him.
1. The Agent for the Republic of Cuba (Banco Nacional de Cuba)
The agent for the Republic of Cuba had had possession of the sugar,
but parted with the actual possession of it in reliance upon a sales con-
tract-a promise by the broker-dealer to pay to Cuba or its agent the
purchase price of the sugar. After the sugar left Cuba, Cuba had retained
constructive possession by holding shipping documents relating to that
sugar, but parted with these shipping documents in accordance with the
terms of its contract and with the usual commercial expectation of imme-
diate payment of a sight draft on delivery. When these shipping docu-
ments were retained and negotiated, but no payment was made, the
Republic of Cuba sued the broker-dealer for conversion of those docu-
ments.
Banco Nacional de Cuba (agent for the Republic of Cuba), plaintiff,
whatever the language, in its prayer for relief, really asked the federal
courts of the United States:
1. to "recognize" that the Cuban law transferred to Cuba the title of the sugar and
that this was a fully completed act within the jurisdiction of Cuba;
2. to "recognize" that pursuant to the act of state doctrine Cuban law is the law
to be applied in the United States to property which has been subjected to
Cuban law;
3. to "enforce" the United States law relating to "conversion" of the shipping
documents showing constructive possession of the sugar to whoever had possession
of these documents, and that the broker-dealer who had converted them be held
liable for their value, i.e., the purchase price of the sugar; and
4. to hold that the sugar company (or receiver) had illegally received the purchase
price for sugar belonging to Cuba, and that this purchase price should be paid to
Cuba's agent.
2. The Broker-Dealer (Farr, Whitlock & Co.)
To secure the quantity of sugar it needed to fulfill a contract with its
customer, the broker-dealer had made at different dates the same contract
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with two separate parties to purchase the identical quantity of sugar to
be loaded on a particular ship. The first contract (February and July)
was with the sugar company which, at the time for the delivery of the
sugar (August), did not have possession of the sugar; the second contract
(August) was with the Republic of Cuba which at the time did have
possession. At the time of the suit both the Republic of Cuba and the
sugar company claimed title to the sugar. For a brief moment the broker-
dealer had held constructive possession of the sugar by holding the ship-
ping documents delivered to him with sight draft attached. He had the
sugar, negotiated the documents, delivered the sugar, and received pay-
ment. He then stood in a dilemma: each of the two parties holding con-
tracts with him for that same sugar claimed the purchase price. All the
broker-dealer wanted was an end of the matter without liability.
The broker-dealer, defendant, asked the court:
1. to confirm the propriety of his payment to the receiver of the sugar company, or
2. if the court found title in the Republic of Cuba, to hold him harmless from the
charge of conversion, and approve a cross-claim against the receiver; or otherwise
3. to grant a counterclaim against Cuba for money paid on a previous unrelated
shipment of sugar from Cuba 5
3. The Receiver of the Sugar Company's New York Assets
(Peter L. F. Sabbatino)
The receiver joined in the claim that the efforts of the Cuban Govern-
ment to seize all the assets of the sugar company in Cuba had on various
grounds not affected title to this particular quantity of gugar and that
the title to this sugar remained in the sugar company.
The receiver (also defendant) asked the court to declare him entitled
to keep the purchase price on the ground that the sugar company had
title.
B. What the Lower Courts Did Under the New Theory of Law
They Created
The district court gave judgment for the defendants; it dismissed the
complaint against them. The broker-dealer was not liable for conversion
of the shipping documents because, as the court found, it had paid the
purchase price of the sugar covered by those shipping documents to the
company (or its receiver) which held title to that sugar. The court
decided the sugar company was the title holder and therefore the legal
recipient of the purchase price of the sugar. On the other hand, in hold-
ing that the Republic of Cuba had never acquired title to the sugar, the
court decided that the confiscatory law of Cuba (Law 851) was not valid,
55. 307 F.2d at 852.
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regardless of the intention of the Government of Cuba, and regardless
of that Government's execution of its intention by the actual seizure of
that very sugar. The reason given by the district court was that this whole
act of state by Cuba was invalid because it was contrary to international
law, and thus nothing Cuba did transferred title. It was a confiscation,
a seizure without compensation, and was discriminatory, being wholly
directed against American property in retaliation against the United
States for its reduction of Cuba's sugar quota. The decision of the district
court was affirmed by the court of appeals, which adopted the theory of
law put forward by the court below.
Both courts were well aware that their decisions were on a theory of law
new to the courts of the United States; that "under the ordinary rules of
conflict of laws, title to this sugar would be determined by the law of
Cuba, namely, the decree of expropriation of August 6, 1960." They
knew the theory they adopted had been honored by some legal writers
but seldom anywhere in the world in legal practice.
In its reversal, the Supreme Court of the United States held that the
act of state doctrine, repudiated by the lower courts, must be upheld.
The Supreme Court found it unwise to adopt a new theory of law, stating
that
when we consider the prospect of the courts characterizing foreign expropriations,
however justifiably, as invalid under international law and ineffective to pass title,
the wisdom of the precedents is confirmed357
C. The Three Rules of Law Used by the Lower Courts
To Accomplish One Result in the Sabbatino Case
Comparison of the various statements made by the district court and
the court of appeals shows that three separate and distinct theories of
law were relied upon to support the decision and its affirmation, to prove
that the receiver who held the purchase price was the representative of
the owner, the sugar company. The theories of law expounded were:
1. That the lower courts of the United States will not enforce the con-
fiscatory laws of Cuba in a suit against a person within the jurisdiction
of the United States whose property was confiscated in Cuba but who
nevertheless is in possession of the property or the purchase price of some
of that property. If courts should find that the confiscation decrees had
not been accomplished, i.e., fully executed, and that without an affirmative
action on their part within the United States, the results of the confisca-
56. Id. at 854.
57. 32 U.SL. Week at 4238.
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tion decree could not be accomplished, United States courts may properly
decline to take such an active step.,'
2.. That the lower courts of the United States will not "recognize" the
confiscatory laws of Cuba in a suit against a national of the United
States whose property was confiscated in Cuba. Although the lower courts
appeared to use the word "recognize," with more than one possible mean-
ing, it is clear that it was the intention of the courts to proceed in deter-
mination of the case on the unrebuttable presumption that the law of
Cuba, intended by Cuba to be confiscatory, did not deprive the American
owners of property in Cuba of their title, and that without regard to its
intent or actions taken, Cuba did not acquire title. The result of this
refusal by American lower courts to "recognize" the legal result of the
intended-to-be confiscatory law was that under American law all Amer-
ican companies which Cuba sought to confiscate and nationalize would
still own all their assets in Cuba. This abolished the former rule of deci-
sion that
when wrongs are inflicted by one nation upon another, in tempestuous times, they
cannot be redressed by the judicial department. Its power cannot extend beyond
the territorial jurisdiction. However unjust a confiscation may be, a judicial con-
demnation closes the judicial eye upon its enormity.5 9
The United States Supreme Court has reestablished this principle. What
the effects would have been on American interests had the rule of the
lower court prevailed should be reviewed to indicate that the rule re-
instated by the Supreme Court is the one which is protective of American
rights.
3. That the law of nations as interpreted by the lower courts of the
United States may be administered by any court of any nation in respect
to the laws of any other nation, and municipal laws held contrary to the
law of nations may be found to be null and void; that sovereignty is
limited to the exercise of the powers of government sanctioned by inter-
national law and that an attempt to exercise powers in excess of those
permitted is futile. Such a declaration is a denial of the sovereign power
of every nation in the world. The United States Supreme Court reaffirmed
the independent sovereignty of the United States.
VII. WHAT THE INCIDENTAL EFFECTS MIGHT HAVE BEEN HAD
THE DECISION OF THE LOWER COURTS BEEN SUSTAINED
What would the decision of the lower courts have meant to the Amer-
ican-owned sugar company deprived of its valuable and prosperous Cuban
58. Whether or not the sugar company was justifiably in possession of the purchase
price would depend on whether or not the broker-dealer had converted the bills of lading.
59. The Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 131 (1812) (Argument
of Mr. Pinkney, Attorney General of the United States.)
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properties? What would it have meant to those other Americans who had
invested in Cuba? What would it have meant to all American foreign
investment?
As to one shipload of sugar the meaning and result of the lower courts'
decision was clear. The courts found that the one essential issue in the
case was the "title" to that shipload of sugar.
The courts had not been asked to put the title holder in possession, for
no party to the Sabbatino case had possession of that sugar at the time
of the commencement of the action or of the decision. The relation be-
tween "title" and "possession" did not have to be considered. The re-
ceiver held the proceeds from the sale.
The sugar company had indeed claimed title to the sugar in the case,
but it had not claimed-it had no reason to claim-that it still had title to
all of its property still in Cuba-93,000,000 worth at the time of
seizure.6" In deciding that title to the one shipload of sugar (value
$175,000) remained in the sugar company, the lower courts casually
and incidentally, but no less conclusively, determined that the title to all
the rest of the sugar company's property in Cuba (value $93,000,000)
remained in the sugar company and that the title to all other American
property in Cuba (value about $1,000,000,000) remained in those persons
and companies which had held title before the passage of Cuba's con-
fiscation law and the resolutions issued under it.
The intention of Cuba to transfer title to itself was but one of the
desired results encompassed in Cuba's act of state. To secure the nation-
ally desired result, of which the acquisition of title was a part, other
steps had necessarily been taken by Cuba. The lower courts of the United
States refused to "recognize" this one feature of Cuba's act of state.
Title is a legal concept, a legal conclusion derived from evidentiary facts
and in case of doubt confirmed by a court. Did the lower courts deny
that the property had been "seized," thus refusing to recognize that part
of the act of state which was the physical imposition of Cuba's will on
the property? If they denied the validity of Cuba's act of state in its
entirety, Cuba would have been wholly exonerated, for it would have been
found neither to have taken title nor to have seized the property. The
lower courts, however, did recognize that the property had been
"seized";61 but it had been seized by Cuba, which the courts held had
no "title" nor could acquire "title" under Cuba's own national law.
Under the lower courts' decision in the Sabbatino case, title to the
60. Schwartz v. Compania Azucarera-Camaguey de Cuba, 39 Misc. 2d 63, 71, 240
N.Y.S.2d 247, 255 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
61. "[Tjhis court is not so unfamiliar with the legal, political, and social circumstances
surrounding the Castro government's seizure of CA.V. as to be incompetent to pass
on its validity under international law." 307 F.2d at 860.
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Cuban properties and possession of those properties remained distinct
and apart; no Americans had possession, but all had title. Cuba had
possession but no title. The lower courts found that title was in the sugar
company, but they were powerless to put the title holder in possession
of the properties. Such a situation would have raised the following
questions:
1. Would the sugar company still have been liable for all of its obligations due
or to become due, outstanding as of August 6, 1960? It still had title to the prop-
erties. If Cuba had not acquired title to the assets, perhaps it would not be obligated
for liabilities.
2. Would the sugar company have been required to reduce its claim against Cuba
filed with the State Department? The sugar company had claimed a loss by con-
fiscation of $93,000,000 (the value of its Cuban assets), but since under the lower
courts' decision it still held title, its property was not confiscated though Cuba's
agents occupied the property without consent of the title holder.
3. What would the sugar company have had to have done to make its peace with
the Treasury of the United States? The company's loss would have been far less
than it thought it was before the lower courts' decision in the Sabbatlino case. The
sugar company's balance sheet for the future would have looked very odd, for it
would carry as an asset $93,000,000 worth of property to which the company had
title but from which it derived no income and of which it did not even have
possession.
Our courts had never before indulged in such polemics. But the result
of any effort similar to that attempted by the lower courts was considered
many years ago by an eminent Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States who also wrote authoritative treatises on the law. Any effort
by one country to affect property in another, he said,
would be equivalent to a declaration that the sovereignty over a territory was never
exclusive in any nation, but only concurrent with that of all nations; that each could
legislate for all, and none for itself; and that all might establish rules which none
were bound to obey. The absurd results of such a state of things need not be
dwelt upon.02
The United States Supreme Court has now restored the act of state
doctrine to the tenets of American law. The anomalies which would have
resulted from the lower courts' decision are eliminated. Cuba stands be-
fore the world as the confiscator of American property in Cuba; it has
both title and possession-and has paid nothing. The United States Su-
preme Court has pointed out that already our Government has taken
steps to right this great wrong on American property owners and further
efforts will be sure to follow.
VIII. THE RULE OF DECISION FOR THE FUTURE
The Supreme Court of the United States did more than overrule deci-
sions of the lower courts. The Supreme Court was aware that many cases
62. Story, Commentaries on Conflict of Laws § 20, at 8 (8th ed. 1883).
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arising out of the Cuban debacle were pending in courts of the United
States. (Briefs filed had brought this to the court's attention.) Other
cases doubtless would be brought. In some of the cases before our courts
the Cuban Government itself was a litigant, as in the Sabbatino case, and
might be in others. The issues to be litigated were diverse.
The Supreme Court therefore very properly in its decision answered
various questions which had been brought up in the course of the litiga-
tion. In its determination of these issues, and by its comments concerning
them, the Supreme Court in effect created lines of guidance for United
States courts in deciding cases involving international controversies. A
few of these comments or determinations may properly be brought to-
gether, particularly to illustrate the fact that by re-establishing and
confirming the act of state doctrine, the Supreme Court did not narrow the
area of judicial authority which United States courts have heretofore
exercised. The following guiding comments from the United States
Supreme Court decision in the Sabbatino case are of significance.
The Republic of Cuba, although a country which has shown great
animosity to the United States, may nevertheless enter our courts to sue
and be sued.
We hold that this petitioner is not barred from access to the federal courts.6a
The Supreme Court recognized that Cuba had expropriated American
property. When the Cuban act of state was executed in Cuba, title to the
seized property was in Cuba. The Court, in its opening statement, defined
the issue before it:
The question which brought this case here, and is now found to be the dispositive
issue, is whether the so-called act of state doctrine serves to sustain petitioner's
claims in this litigation. Such claims are ultimately founded on a decree of the
Government of Cuba expropriating certain property, the right to the proceeds of
which is here in controversy. 64
Cuba's restraint of the S.S. Honifels [on which the sugar was loaded] must be
regarded for these purposes to have constituted an effective taking of the sugar,
vesting in Cuba C. A. V.'s property right in it.65
The Supreme Court, in re-establishing the act of state doctrine, was
careful to define it:
Therefore, rather than laying down or reaffirming an inflexible and all-encompassing
rule in this case, we decide only that the Judicial Branch will not examine the
validity of a taking of property within its own territory by a foreign sovereign
government, extant and recognized by this country at the time of suit, in the
absence of a treaty or other unambiguous agreement regarding controlling legal
63. 32 U.ST.. Week at 4233.
64. Id. at 4229.
65. Id. at 4233.
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principles, even if the complaint alleges that the taking violates customary inter-
national law.66
The Court pointed out:
The doctrine as formulated in past decisiofis expresses the strong sense of the Judi-
cial Branch that its engagement in the task of passing on the validity of foreign
acts of state may hinder rather than further this country's pursuit of goals both for
itself and for the community of nations as a whole in the international sphere.07
The Supreme Court then gave assurance that although the lower courts
are precluded from declaring an act of a foreign state void or invalid
because in their view it is contrary to international law, the courts will
adjudicate as they have in the past. The Court pointed out that:
Despite the broad statement in Oetjen that "The conduct of the foreign relations
of our Government is committed by the Constitution to the Executive and Legis-
lative . . . Departments," 246 U.S., at 302, it cannot of course be thought that
"cevery case or controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial
cognizance." Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211.68
In fact, the Supreme Court gave assurances that since the lower courts
will no longer feel themselves obligated to pass upon the validity of an
act of a foreign state, their facility in judging cases involving foreign
relations will be increased.
It should be apparent that the greater the degree of codification or consensus con-
cerning a particular area of international law, the more appropriate it is for the
judiciary to render decisions regarding it, since the courts can then focus on the
application of an agreed principle to circumstances of fact rather then on the sen-
sitive task of establishing a principle not inconsistent with the national interest or
with international justice.69
Application of international law, where relevant and indicated, will
continue to be made.
Although it is, of course, true that United States courts apply international law as
a part of our own in appropriate circumstances, Ware v. Hilton, 3 Dall. 199, 281;
The Nereide, 9 Cranch, 388, 423; The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700, the
public law of nations can hardly dictate to a country which is in theory wronged
how to treat that wrong within its domestic borders. 70
As to any specific matters relating to the operation of the courts within
this field, the Supreme Court found that counterclaims based upon the
invalidity of the transfer of title to Cuba are not proper counterclaims,
stating:
66. Id. at 4238. No treaty, either unilateral or multilateral, was involved in Sabbatino.
Therefore there was no need to discuss treaties as domestic law, foreign law or Inter-
national law.
67. Id. at 4236.
68. Ibid.
69. Id. at 4237.
70. Id. at 4236.
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Since the act of state doctrine proscribes a challenge to the validity of the Cuban
expropriation decree in this case, any counterclaim based on asserted invalidity must
fail.7'
No other type of counterclaim was before the Supreme Court in the
Sabbatino case. An act of state, though recognized as valid within the
territory of a sovereign country, is not devoid of legal consequences in
other countries, and may give rise to a claim against that sovereign pre-
cisely because its validity is unquestioned. A defensive counterclaim
(based upon such. recognition of validity and that an independent suit
may not be brought against the sovereign for claims based upon a com-
pleted act of state) has heretofore been permitted within the United
States against a sovereign in mitigation or extinction of the sovereign's
claim, when such a sovereign, in seeking the aid of our courts, has sub-
mitted itself to an adjudication of its rights. The Supreme Court of the
United States has heretofore held,72 and the State Department has con-
curred7 3 that neither a plea of sovereign immunity nor one that the
counterclaim is based upon such a valid act of state will prevent adjudica-
tion of such a defensive counterclaim.
The Court expressed itself generally as to the lack of immunity which
a sovereign has as to counterclaims:
An analogy is drawn to the area of sovereign immunity, National City Bank v.
Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356, in which, if a foreign country seeks redress in our
courts, counterclaims are permissible. But immunity relates to the prerogative right
not to have sovereign property subject to suit; fairness has been thought to require
that when the sovereign seeks recovery, it be subject to legitimate counterclaims
against it. The act of state doctrine, however, although it shares with the immunity
doctrine a respect for sovereign states, concerns the limits for determining the validity
of an otherwise applicable rule of law.74
The Supreme Court recognized, as American courts always have, that
the area in which relief can be granted by courts is limited by lack of
jurisdiction. As to righting international wrongs in such an area, there is
now, as before, seldom other relief than that afforded through diplomatic
channels and the various political and economic pressures which may be
placed by the Legislature and Executive upon a recalcitrant country,
whose acts of state fully executed within their own country have damaged
American interests. In this area the mere privilege assumed by the lower
courts in the Sabbatino case of declaring the act of state of a foreign
country null and void would be of little effect.
71. I& at 4241.
72. National City Bank v. Republic of China, 348 US. 356 (1955).
73. Letter From Department of State to the Ambassador of the Republic of China, Sept.
26, 1955, in 43 Dep't State Bull. 750 (1955).
74. 32 U.S.L. Week at 4241.
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When one considers the variety of means possessed by this country to make secure
foreign investment, the persuasive or coercive effect of judicial invalidation, of acts
of expropriation dwindles in comparison. The newly independent states are in need
of continuing foreign investment; the creation of a climate unfavorable to such in-
vestment by wholesale confiscations may well work to their long-run economic dis-
advantage. Foreign aid given to many of these countries provides a powerful lever
in the hands of the political branches to ensure fair treatment of United States
nationals. Ultimately the sanctions of economic embargo and the freezing of assets
in this country may be employed.7 5
IX. THE NEW RULE OF LAW ADOPTED BY THE LOWER COURTS
WOULD HAVE IMPAIRED THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE UNITED STATES
When the receiver of the sugar company requested the district court
to permit him to retain the purchase price of the shipload of sugar previ-
ously seized in Cuba by the Cuban government, the court responded by
declaring that Cuba had not acquired title to any of the property seized
by Cuba in Cuba under Law 851. This one step into extraterritoriality
was not the final step of either lower court in that direction; their final
step was to lay down a rule of "sanction," which was to be exercised by
any court over the acts of any foreign sovereign, which that court found
were not in accord with the principles of international law. This would
have been a new principle in international relations, a limitation on sov-
ereignty: no nation would have had sovereign power to make and enforce
a valid law unless that law was in accord with the principles of inter-
national law! Thus the courts of any country would have had the power
and the duty to determine the validity of a law affecting its own nationals
which had been passed by any other foreign country.
Both the district and circuit courts stated this proposition in blunt and
unequivocal language. The district court recognized that judicial refusal
to examine the validity of acts of foreign states is usually "a wise recogni-
tion of and respect for the sovereignty of each state within its own terri-
tory, the right of each state to conduct its own internal affairs as it
wishes.""0 Nevertheless the district court found:
The basis for such recognition and respect vanishes . . . when the act of a foreign
state violates not what may be our provincial notions of policy but rather the
standards imposed by international law. There is an end to the right of national
sovereignty when the sovereign's acts impinge on international law. 77
The circuit court was equally catholic in the universality of its pro-
nouncements concerning the limited right of any sovereign:
75. Id. at 4240. Cuban assets are now frozen. Property of and debts due 'Cuba are
subject to disposition by U. S. Government.
76. 193 F. Supp. at 381.
77. Ibid.
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[T]he very proposition that something known as international law exists carries
with it the implication that national sovereignty is not absolute but is limited, where
the international law impinges, by the dictates of this international law.78
Refusal by municipal courts of one sovereignty to sanction the action of a foreign
state done contrary to the law of nations will often be the only deterrent to such
violations.79
The Government of the United States inevitably would have been
subject to this limitation. The language was incapable of any other inter-
pretation than as a universal proposition that no sovereign could pass a
valid law unless it was in accord with international law.
Thus, the lower courts' decision did two things: (1) It imposed an
obligation on all courts of the United States-fifty-two separate juris-
dictions (fifty states, the District of Columbia, and the nationwide fed-
eral jurisdiction divided into eleven circuits)-to interpret and administer
international law wherever they believed it was applicable to a case be-
fore them involving a law of a foreign country. They were empowered
and directed to declare any act of any foreign government ineffective
within that government's own country if such court-any American court
-decided that the act was contrary to international law. (2) Recipro-
cally, all courts of all foreign countries would then have had not only
the power, but in behalf of their own nationals, the obligation, to decide
any law of the United States ineffective if they in turn found the United
States had violated international law, in a manner to affect adversely their
own nationals.
To make these determinations was an absolute obligation on all courts,
as the court of appeals found (in declaring Cuba's act to be without legal
effect on property in Cuba):
Finally, although it can be argued that nationalistic prejudice could affect decision
in cases of this sort, it is also often claimed that other biases in various obnoxious
forms are present in the minds of judges in other types of cases. Judges are properly
admonished when reminded that judicial duty requires that controversies be
decided fairly and without passion, but we also have a duty not to excuse our-
selves from exercising the duty of decision when parties and subject matter are
properly before us. Thus neither reason nor precedent preclude this court from
considering the appellees' contentions, based upon international law concepts, that
the court below should be affirmed.80
But until the day of capable international adjudication among countries, the munic-
ipal courts must be the custodians of the concepts of international law, and they
must expound, apply and develop that law whenever they are called upon to do so.81
78. 307 F.2d at 860.
79. Id. at 868.
80. Id. at 860.
81. Id. at 861.
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The obligation thus imposed by the lower courts' decision was an
obligation to interpret international law and apply it to the acts of for-
eign states. The lower courts, however, found it somewhat difficult to
determine just what were the concepts of international law which under
their decisions all the municipal courts throughout the world were to
apply. The court of appeals observed:
Although the law of nations is a hazy concept, its rules are more limited in scope
than are the public policy concepts of a particular nation within the family of
nations.82
Anyone who undertakes a search for the principles of international law cannot help
but be aware of the nebulous nature of the substance we call international law.88
The court of appeals recognized a further difficulty, namely, that a
local court of the United States, and so of any country, should not apply
its own national concepts of propriety but should find principles which
were applicable to all countries of the world-those countries adhering
to the doctrine of free enterprise, and those which had embraced the
principles of Karl Marx as a national policy. The court of appeals warned
itself and all other courts of this danger which they should avoid:
One pitfall into which we could stumble would be the identification as a funda-
mental principle of international law of some principle which in truth is only an
aspect of the public policy of our own nation and not a principle so cherished by
other civilized peoples. In avoiding such an identification we must take a more cos-
mopolitan view of things and recognize that the rule of law which we municipally
announce must be a rule applicable to sovereignties with social and eocnomic patterns
very different from our own.84
The court of appeals was not unmindful of the fact that imposing an
obligation upon courts to determine international law as it should be
applied outside of their own jurisdictions would have meant that these
international matters would frequently have to be determined by judges
unfamiliar with law in these areas but who would nevertheless have to
proceed with little accepted authority to guide them.
Judges of municipal courts, the bulk of whose decisions involve questions under a
domestic law derived from a long-established and increasingly elaborate national
legal system, will often find themselves unfamiliar with the ratiocination necessary
for decision in this area, where recognized precedent and accepted authority are
scant.85
Viewed as a proposed new system, there seems but little to commend
it. Determination of "hazy" and "nebulous" legal concepts to be applied
by judges "unfamiliar with the ratiocination necessary for decision in
82. Id. at 859.
83. Id. at 860.
84. Id. at 861.
85. Id. at 860.
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this area," obligated to enforce a rule satisfactory to free enterprise
countries, communist countries, and all other countries, would seem more
likely to produce insoluble confusion than it would be to create a body
of law, which as the lower courts had determined would be superior to
every nation's own constitution and legislature. It is not surprising that
our State Department called to the attention of the United States Su-
preme Court the probability that confusion would result rather than that
international law could be interpreted and developed in this manner.
With this confusion of law, .confusion of titles in international trade
inevitably would have followed.
Aside from the practicality of the operation of such a new system as
was proposed by the lower courts, the American citizen and Government
would have had to repudiate it utterly as an heretical doctrine subversive
of the fundamental propositions upon which our country was founded
and upon which it maintains its position in the world.
X. BASIC CONCEPTS OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY WOULD HAVE BEEN
DENIED HAD THE LOWER CoURTs' DECISION BEEN AFFIRMED
IN THE Sabbatino CASE
The Government of the United States established itself before the
nations of the world on three fundamental principles-political inde-
pendence, absolute sovereignty, and equality of nations. It maintains its
position by insistence that as to it, all nations recognize these three prin-
ciples; and reciprocally, this country recognizes the absolute sovereignty
and complete equality of every other state which it recognizes politically
as independent.
A. Political Independence
On July 4, 1776, the United States declared its independence:
WE, THEREF ORE, the Representatives of the UNrTED STATES OF AmERICA, in
General Congress assembled, appealing to the Supreme Judge of the world for
the rectitude of our intentions, do, in the Name, and by Authority of the good
People of these Colonies, solemnly publish and declare, That these United Colonies
are, and of Right ought to be FREE AND INDEPENDENT STATES ....
It was seven years before that independence was achieved. It was twelve
years before those colonies, by the adoption of the Constitution "in order
to form a more perfect union," had achieved that form of government
which they had declared in the Declaration of Independence to be the
government they sought--"instituted among men deriving their just
powers from the consent of the governed." Thus was achieved popular
government, a state where the people ruled, a state in which those un-
limited powers of sovereignty originated in the people and those which
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were not transmitted to the federal government for the purpose of gov-
erning, were reserved to the states or to the people.
B. Absolute Sovereignty
No better definition of sovereignty, as understood in the United States,
has been made than that of Mr. Chief Justice Marshall:
The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory, is necessarily exclusive
and absolute; it is susceptible of no limitation, not imposed by itself. Any restriction
upon it, deriving validity from an external source, would imply a diminution of
its sovereignty, to the extent of the restriction, and an investment of that sovereignty,
to the same extent, in that power which could impose such restriction. All excep-
tions, therefore, to the full and complete power of a nation, within its own terri-
tories, must be traced up to the consent of the nation itself. They can flow from no
other legitimate source.8 6
The absolute sovereignty as proclaimed and practiced by the United
States for itself and accorded to other nations included the right validly
to enact and validly to enforce laws within the jurisdiction of their own
country even if those laws were contrary to international law.
Americans should be very proud of the fact that before this nation
was six years old, while still a nation poor in financial resources and
weak militarily, it passed a law making unlawful within its jurisdiction
an international trade recognized as wholly legitimate by the law of
nations. This was in 1794, when the United States first took steps to out-
law the slave trade. The United States was the first nation in the world
to enact a municipal law declaring the international slave trade a crime.8"
Mr. Chief Justice Marshall, while personally abhorring the trade, found
he must recognize foreign title to some of the slaves brought into the
United States on a ship captured by an American cruiser (a foreign gov-
ernment claimed title to some of the slaves and the United States returned
them), the capture having been made outside of the territorial waters of
the United States. Mr. Chief Justice Marshall said:
That trade [the slave trade] could not be considered as contrary to the law of
nations which was authorized and protected by the laws of all commercial nations;
the right to carry on which was claimed by each, and allowed by each.88
The United States in this instance applied international law because
the act of acquiring title of the slaves was under the law of a foreign
86. The Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 135 (1812).
87. Although the institution of slavery continued in some states until the Emancipation
Proclamation, the trade of bringing slaves into the United States was first restricted by
the Act of Mar. 22, 1794, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 347. The prohibitions against the slave trade
were enlarged and strengthened by Act of May 10, 1800, ch. 51, 2 Stat. 70; Act of
Mar. 2, 1807, ch. 22, 2 Stat. 426; Act of Apr. 20, 1818, 3 Stat. 450.
88. The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 115 (1825).
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nation and took place outside of the jurisdiction of the United States,
and therefore was not in violation of our statute prohibiting the slave
trade within our jurisdiction. However, any person trying thereafter to
ply this trade to bring slaves into the United States, legal by the law of
nations, illegal by United States municipal law, would be treated as a
smuggler and would have no contrary rights in this country under inter-
national law. Other nations soon followed the lead of the United States
in declaring the slave trade unlawful under their own respective munici-
pal laws. It was but a few years after the case cited above, and after
England had joined the United States in outlawing the slave trade, that
an English court found that slaving had at that time become an act
contrary to international law. The English court recognized that the
United States was the first by its municipal law to outlaw this trade which
at the time was protected by the law of nations. The English court said
that "so far as respected the transportation of slaves to the colonies of
foreign nations, this trade had been prohibited by the laws of America
only . . .
A hundred years later, by an amendment to our Constitution,"0 we
outlawed another international business and thereafter enforced the
enabling laws against smuggling liquor into the United States, taking
title to any vessel or other facilities found engaged in this trade within
jurisdictional limits of the United States, a trade illegal by the municipal
law of the United States but legal under international law.
In a case brought by the owner of a foreign ship to retrieve his ship
seized by American forces as a "rumrunner," the United States courts
found that that particular seizure was indeed illegal because the action
taken was not authorized by the terms of the statute under which the
seizure was purported to have been made. The court, however, rejected
the argument based upon the contention that the laws of the United States
in support of the Prohibition Act were void, or should not be enforced, be-
cause in violation of international law. The court said:
It is not the function of the courts to annul legislation; it is their duty to interpret
and by their judicial decrees to enforce it . . . . If, however, the court has no
option to refuse the enforcement of legislation in contravention of the principles
of international law, it does not follow that . . .it may not assume that the Con-
gressional Act did not deliberately intend to infringe them. . . . Congress may, in
disregard of the law of nations, prohibit acts by foreign nationals not committed
within our domain . . .but unless such intent clearly appears from the language
of the statute such intent is not to be presumed....oi
The United States has on occasion been accused of violation of interna-
89. The Amedie, 1 Acton 240, 250, 12 Eng. Rep. 92, 96 (1810).
90. U.S. Const. amend. XVIII.
91. The Over the Top, 5 F.2d 838, 842-43 (D.C. Conn. 1925).
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tional law, and actions of the executive department, such as the seizure
of foreign property, have sometimes been condemned by our own courts,
sometimes by an international court.
At a very early date in our history an overzealous government official
seized property of an Englishman, claiming that a declaration of war
made all enemy property in the United States forfeit. Mr. Chief Justice
Marshall found that under international law property of an enemy na-
tional was immune from seizure, but that a country at war could make
a local law seizing all enemy property. Such a confiscation law would be
valid. Since the United States had not made such a law, he found the
seizure of English property a violation of international law, and the
United States liable for its act. He said:
This usage [international law] is a guide which the sovereign follows or abandons
at his will; the rule, like other precepts of morality, of humanity, and even of
wisdom, is addressed to the judgment of the sovereign; and although it cannot be
disregarded by him without obloquy, yet it may be disregarded.0 2
In World War I, the United States seized within United States territory
a number of ships of foreign nations, some uncompleted but in the process
of being built. It paid the owners of the ships and the holders of ship-
building contracts what it considered a proper price. The Norwegian
shipowners whose vessels or building contracts had been seized protested
vigorously to their Government that the United States had seized prop-
erty for a public purpose but without payment of adequate compensa-
tion93 and thus, by the United States' own definition of international law
as well as by its own Constitution, was liable for additional sums. The
United States agreed to submit the controversy to an international tri-
bunal. That tribunal, finding that the United States had indeed violated
international law by not paying enough for the ships, entered judgment
against the United States for some millions of dollars. 4 The United
States, still protesting its innocence, paid the award.
After World War II, a German protested that seizure of his property
in the United States as enemy property was contrary to international law.
Admittedly his property had been seized, title vested in the United States,
and no compensation paid. He sued the United States, in the person of
the Attorney General, in a district court of the United States, claiming
that the action of the United States was contrary to international law and
void, and that the court should so declare, just as it would have done if
92. Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110, 128 (1814).
93. U.S. Const. amend. V.
94. Norwegian Shipowners' Claims (Norway v. United States), 1 U.N. Rep. Int'l Arb.
Awards 307 (1922). Part of the claim was for the detention of some of the ships after
the war.
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the law had been found unconstitutional. The district court dismissed
the action and the court of appeals affirmed, holding that:
Whatever force appellant's argument might have in a situation where there is no
applicable treaty, statute, or constitutional provision, it has long been settled in
the United States that the federal courts are bound to recognize any one of these
three sources of law as superior to canons of international law. . . . There is no
power in this court to declare null and void a statute adopted by Congress or a
declaration included in a treaty merely on the ground that such provision violates
a principle of international law....
If Congress adopts a policy that conflicts with the Constitution of the United
States, Congress is then acting beyond its authority and the courts must declare
the resulting statute to be null and void. When, however, a constitutional agency
adopts a policy contrary to a trend in international law or to a treaty or prior
statute, the courts must accept the latest act of that agency.05
In another case after World War II under the same law directing the
seizure and retention of enemy property without compensation,"" the
United States Government seized as German property the majority of
the stock of a large chemical company T Swiss interests claimed the
property Was theirs and not German; nor, the Swiss said, was it held
beneficially for Germans. Upon refusal of the United States to deliver
the property, a Swiss company claiming ownership began suit in the
federal courts of the United States to recover it." Later the Swiss Gov-
ernment espoused its nationals' claims and demanded that the controversy
be submitted to the International Court at The Hague."
When Switzerland attempted to sue the United States in the Interna-
95. Tag v. Rogers, 267 F.2d 664, 666-68 (D.C. Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 904
(1960). Whether or not the treatment after World War II of private German or Japanese
property was contrary to international law is a question the United States Court of
Appeals held it had no authority to consider. The property was seized in lieu of reparations,
in war settlement, to which the defeated countries agreed. Germany promised to reimburse
its nationals, Japan did not. For discussion of the issues in this controversy, see Jessup,
Enemy Property, 49 Am. J. Int'l Law 57 (1955); de Vries, The International Responsibility
of the United States for Vested German Assets, 51 Am. J. Int'l L. 18 (1957).
96. Trading with the Enemy Act § 39(a), 62 Stat. 1246 (1948), 50 U.S.C. app. § 39
(Supp. IV, 1963), which reads in part as follows: "No property or interest therein of
Germany, Japan, or any national of either such country vested in or transferred to any
officer or agency of the Government at any time after December 17, 1941, pursuant to the
provisions of this Act, shall be returned to former owners thereof or their successors in
interest, and the United States shall not pay compensation for any such property or
interest therein."
97. General Aniline and Film Corporation. The stock was estimated to be worth over
$100,000,000. Interhandel Case-Pleadings, Oral Arguments, and Documents 364 (I.C.J.
1959).
98. The most recent decision in the federal courts of the United States, Rogers v.
Socit6 Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S-A., 278 F.2d
628 (D.C. Cir. 1960), gives a brief history of this domestic litigation.
99. Interhandel Case, [19591 I.C.J. Rep. 6.
1964]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
tional Court, the United States invoked the Connally Amendment,'0°
claiming that the United States' determination whether or not the prop-
erty which it had seized was German or was Swiss was purely a domestic
matter. In its brief, the United States said:
This determination [by the United States of America] is not subject to review
or approval by any Tribunal .... [I]t operates to remove definitively from the juris-
diction of the Court the matter which it determines.1 1
[T]here is no jurisdiction in this Court to hear or determine any issues raised
by the Swiss Application or Memorial concerning the sale or disposition of the
vested shares of General Aniline & Film Corporation (including the passage of good
and clear title to any person or entity), for the reason that such sale or disposition
has been determined by the United States . . . to be a matter essentially within the
domestic jurisdiction of this country .... 102
In this way the United States has refused to permit the International
Court to "sit in judgment" upon any act of state of the United States
which the United States in its sole discretion has determined is a matter
within the domestic jurisdiction of the United States. Under the doctrine
of the equality of states by which reciprocity must be granted, it is
reasonable that whenever the United States would wish the court to ad-
judicate some controversy between it and another country, that other
country should have the privilege of invoking the same reservation even
if it had not previously made such a reservation.
With the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Sabbatino,
the absolute sovereignty of the United States remains unimpaired, and
the rule laid down by Mr. Chief Justice Marshall is still in effect, that
any nation can violate international law within its own territory, but that
any nation which does so bears the "obloquy" of its acts. In short, it is
liable for its misdeeds. Restitution or compensation will be sought by the
Government of those despoiled nationals in any way in which one nation
may cause another to respond to its international claim. Such a method
may be any governmental action-e.g., diplomatic protest, adjudication
by its courts if they have jurisdiction, submission to international courts
100. The International Court is not presumed to have jurisdiction over matters strictly
within the domestic jurisdiction of any country which acknowledges that court's jurisdic-
tion, but the United States, to assure itself there would be no encroachment upon matters
strictly domestic, limited its adherence to the court by a reservation approved by Congrdss
known as the "Connally Amendment." By this amendment the United States asserted Its
right to determine for itself what were strictly domestic matters. This reservation excludes
from the jurisdiction of the International Court matters essentially within our domestic
jurisdiction, "as determined by the United States of America." 61 Stat. 1218, T.I.A.S. No.
1598 (adopted by the Senate Aug. 2, 1946, 92 Cong. Rec. 10706).
101. Interhandel Case-Pleadings, Oral Arguments, and Documents 320 (I.C.J. 1959).
102. Id. at 328.
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if consent be obtained, embargo, blocking of assets, blockade, cold war
or war itself.
C. Equality of Nations
The equality of nations has been a basic American principle since the
Republic was founded, and the United States has never deviated from
its insistence on it. It is this principle of equality between nations which
distinguishes between "East" and "West." Although the United States
endeavors to treat with equality all nations which it recognizes diplo-
matically, we know that the U.S.S.R. and the nations of the Soviet bloc
do not have equality-one is dominant, the others satellite. On the other
hand, every alliance to which the United States is a party is based upon
equality of nations. For example, Article II, Section 1 of the United
Nations Charter reads:
The Organization and its Members, in pursuit of the Purposes stated in Article I,
shall act in accordance with the following Principles.
1. The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its
Members.
American authorities have traditionally supported this principle of the
equality of nations:-
The equality of states is one of the most familiar and frequently reiterated prin-
ciples of modem international law. Equality ranks traditionally with sovereignty
and independence as an inherent and unimpeachable. attribute of the state. As an
infant nation the United States asserted the equality of states; as a great world
Power, the United States concedes it.103
No principle of general law is more universally acknowledged, than the perfect
equality of nations. Russia and Geneva have equal rights. It results from this
equality, that no one can rightfully impose a rule on another. . . . As no nation
can prescribe a rule for others, none can make a law of nations .... 104
XI. THE RULE OF LAW UNDER THE LOWER CoURTs' DECISION IN THE
Sabbatino CASE WOULD HAVE CHANGED THE POWERS OF THE THREE
CORRELATIVE BRANCHES OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
The lower courts found that the action of Cuba directed against prop-
erty of Americans in Cuba was contrary to international law. The execu-
tive branch of our Government had already said so and bad demanded
redress. The affront to the United States was the seizure without com-
pensation of American-owned property10 5 Because of this, Cuba had an
103. Jessup, The Equality of States as Dogma and Reality, 60 Pol. Sci. Q. 527 (1945).
104. The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 122 (1825).
105. A breach of international law is an affront by one country to some other country.
A wrong to a citizen of another country does not give immediate rise to an international
claim. Such a claim does not arise unless and until the claims of that citizen are sponsored
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obligation to the United States as the protector of the interests of all
American citizens who had been wronged. All of this was wholly con-
ventional.
A. Comments on International Law by the Lower Courts
in the Sabbatino Case
The lower courts in the Sabbatino case examined the claim of Cuba
that it had not committed a breach of international law.-To give point to
its investigation of Cuba's contention, the court of appeals in Sabbatino
posed for itself this question:
[I]s the failure to provide adequate compensation for the compulsory taking of the
property of the domestically chartered corporation owned by an alien stockholder a
violation of.international law?' 0 6
To answer this question the court of appeals then reviewed the attitudes
of various countries, some of which insist that ownership of private prop-
erty must be abolished for the common good and that in accomplishing
this national purpose there is no obligation to pay the former owner for
the property thus taken. But fortunately, the court of appeals in Sab-
batino found that in this particular instance it didn't have to answer the
question it asked, for it found other factors to consder in addition to
confiscation of property, and said:
Since it is unnecessary for this court in the present case to decide whether a govern-
ment's failure, in and of itself,. to pay adequate compensation for the property it
takes is a breach of international responsibility, we decline at this time to attempt
a resolution of that difficult question.' 07
These factors which the court found were (1) that confiscatory Law 851
was retaliation against the United States for reduction of Cuba's sugar
quota to the United States, and (2) consequently was directed against
Americans only. The court then rephrased its question:
Instead, we narrow the question for decision to the following: Is it a violation of
international law for a country to fail to pay adequate compensation for the property
it seizes from a particular class of aliens, when the purpose for the seizure of tho
property is to retaliate against the homeland of those aliens and when the result of
such seizure is to discriminate against them only.'08
The added factors of retaliation and discrimination, when coupled with
by his own government. By such sponsorship the offense against a citizen becomes an
offense against the country of which he is a national. See Gray v. United States, 21 Ct. CI.
340, 378 (1886), where the court said that "the claims of France, national in their nature,
were thus set up against the claims of the United States, individual in their inception, but
made national by their presentation through the diplomatic department of the Government."
106. 307 F.2d at 862.
107. Id. at 864.
108. Ibid. (Emphasis the court's.)
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the uncompensated seizure, convinced the court that Cuba had committed
a breach of international law against the United States.
However, the court of appeals was still troubled; it was concerned
with the obvious fact that subsequent and prompt action of Cuba con-
fiscated all private property of nearly everybody in Cuba, Cuba having
then adopted the doctrine of the communist countries that private owner-
ship of property was against the national interest. The court of appeals
found that this equality of treatment-the confiscation of other nationals'
property--did not wholly eliminate the discrimination and retaliation
factors against the United States and its citizens, because American prop-
erty was confiscated first and for a different reason. And so the court of
appeals in this case held that there was a breach of international law,
though as the court observed,
perhaps, international law is not violated when equal treatment is accorded aliens
and natives, regardless of the quality of the treatment or the motives behind that
treatment.109
The logical and in fact the only inference from these observations and
conclusions made by the court of appeals is the startling proposition
that if a country embraces communism totally and at one time, and under
such a policy confiscates all of the property of all of the people within
its territory, citizens or foreigners, the act may not be a violation of
international law and the country may owe nothing to anyone. This
conclusion would seem doubly shocking since both lower courts insisted
that international law was part of the law of the United States, and
United States courts would have been obliged to enforce international
law as those courts had found it to be. To cut the legal Gordian knot
into which the lower court tied itself, it is necessary to answer two
questions: (1) What is international law? and (2) In what way is
international law a part of the law of the United States?
1. What is International Law?
International law is the composite rule, written and unwritten, which
nations should observe toward each other in mutual dealings. It includes
the rules to which a nation should adhere in its relation to the citizens
of another country whose lives or property can be affected by its actions.
At that moment of time when one nation or tribe found it useful to trade
with nother and such trade was not forbidden by either, rules of national
conduct became necessary.
In more modern times, international law may thus be defined:
In the absence of an international legislature or court of justice the standard of
duty of the state towards aliens and its international responsibility for violation of
109. Id. at 867.
1964]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
its obligations may be considered the result of a gradual evolution in practice, states
having in their mutual intercourse, recognized certain duties as incumbent upon them.
In the absence of a central authority to enforce this standard of duty upon the
state of residence, international law has granted the home state of the alien who
has suffered by a delinquency the right to demand and enforce compensation for
the injuries sustained. The remedy for a violation of international duty toward
aliens lies in a resort to diplomatic measures for the pecuniary reparation of the
injury; and these measures may range from the diplomatic presentation of a
pecuniary claim to war. Self-help, tempered by the peaceful instrumentalities of mod-
em times, such as arbitration is the ultimate sanction of international obligations. 110
The United States Supreme Court in the Sabbatino case said:
The traditional view of international law is that it establishes substantive principles
for determining whether one country has wronged another.",
The question then asked is: Has Cuba violated a code of conduct which
Americans had a right to expect in foreign countries? A code of conduct
which foreigners may expect in the United States? And if the answer to
this question is that such a breach has occurred, the remaining question
is: In what way may Cuba be forced to make restitution?
2. International Law as Part of the Law of the United States;
The Constitution and the Law of Nations
Three types of customary or unwritten law were practiced in the
English colonies in America before the revolution. These were practiced
after these colonies became free and independent states. They were all
adopted as bodies of law and rules of decision when the United States
adopted the Constitution, by incidental reference to them in that basic
document. These three bodies of customary and unwritten law were,
respectively: the common law,n1 2 admiralty law' and international
law." 4
The terms of any one of these laws can be changed and defined by the
Congress. Any change by Congress of any of these rules supersedes the
original rule and becomes the law of the land. No one will doubt that
the provisions of common law have been changed by statute innumerable
times. The only limitation on changes which can be made in the common
law are the prohibitions which are contained in the Constitution pro-
tective of individual rights. Admiralty law and international law follow
the same rule.
The power to change the terms of admiralty law has always been
recognized:
110. Borchard, Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad 177-78 (1915).
111. 32 U.S.L. Week at 4236.
112. U.S. Const. amend. 7.
113. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2.
114. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8.
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Like all the laws of nations, it rests upon the common consent of civilized com-
munities. It is of force, not because it was prescribed by any superior power, but
because it has been generally accepted as a rule of conduct. 115
The United States Supreme Court has likened the precepts and definitions
of admiralty to those of the common law:
The common law, too, recognises and punishes piracy as an offence, not against its
own municipal code, but as an offence against the law of nations (which is part
of the common law), as an offence against the universal law of society, a pirate
being deemed an enemy of the human race. 110
As to international law, it is the law of the United States but "only
insofar as we adopt it, and like all common or statute law it bends to
the will of Congress."'
International law was first recognized as an independent body of law
in the era frequently referred to as the "age of discovery," and developed
during that succeeding age known as the "age of colonization." ' It is
the law relating particularly to the rise and development of international
industry; its purpose is to secure rights of government to government,
the rights of foreign traders, and rights between nationals of different
countries. A universal statement could properly and accurately be made
that at the time of the formation of our Constitution, all civilized nations
supported the doctrine of free enterprise and the ownership of private
property.
The modem usage of nations, which has become law, would be violated; that sense
of justice and of rights which is acknowledged and felt by the whole civilized world
would be outraged, if private property should be generally confiscated, and private
rights annulled.119
Although the wisdom and fairness of the institution of private property
was questioned and attack upon it begun early in the nineteenth century,
it was not until the Bolshevik revolution of 1917 that any world power
openly and actively espoused the doctrine of no private ownership of
property and built a governmental system upon an anti-private ownership
theory. Since that time the United States, with like-minded nations, has
viewed with concern the adoption of this theory by still other nations.
The lower courts and the United States Supreme Court in Sabbatino,
115. The Scotia, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 170, 187 (1871) (Strong, J.).
116. United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (S Wheat.) 153, 161 (1820). (Emphasis the
Court's.)
117.' The Over the Top, 5 F.2d 838, 842 (D.C. Conn. 1925).
118. Hugo de Groot, writing in Latin under the Latin form of his own name "Grotius,"
published a tract under the title "Mare Librum" as an argument against the claims of
Portuguese to exclusive right to explore certain seas. His chief work, "Dc Jure Belli et
Pads," 1625, is generally considered the first treatise in international law.
119. United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51, 86-87 (1833).
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looking abroad, readily discovered that not all nations believe in the right
of private property. The lower courts apparently endeavored to answer
the question, what are the tenets of international law, by seeking a
median or an average, or determining the majority view as between the
countries which believe in private property and those which do not. If
such a determination of international law-sometimes referred to as a
"nose counting" method' 2° -were adopted and at the same time we con-
tinued to insist that international law as thus found is "part of the law
of the United States," the resulting conclusion would be that the United
States was no longer an independent nation, no longer the master of its
fate, and that other countries could impose upon us the theory that the
seizure of private property without compensation is not a breach of
United States law.
But this reasoning overlooks the Constitution of the United States and
the wisdom of the Founding Fathers, who provided in Article I, Section
8 of the Constitution:
The Congress shall have Power .. .To define and punish Piracies and Felonies
committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations,
and made an enactment of Congress the supreme law, even if it differed
from the law of nations as other countries defined it.
Of course, if we violate international law (as other nations have con-
sidered we have done from time to time), the foreigner who considers
his vested right abrogated has, through his Government, the same right
to demand restitution as the United States has to demand restitution for
seizure of its nationals' properties in Cuba or elsewhere. Sometimes we
have given heed to such protests, sometimes not.
It is indeed desirable that all nations should recognize the same rule
of international law and that the local law of each nation should be in
accord with these principles. But if this cannot be, with different philos-
ophies behind different governments, foreign governments which have
welcomed American investment must recognize their obligation under
our interpretation of international law as to our nationals. There would
be no foreign investment of American private property there if these
foreign countries which accept American investment had not represented
that they would respect the right of private property. There is no private
foreign ownership of industrial properties in communist countries. When
a country suddenly changes its legal philosophy and holds as a matter
of local law that private property shall be no longer tolerated as an insti-
tution, a conflict arises. If such sudden change be made, the United States
will make effort to induce the payment of "prompt, adequate, and effec-
120. See Timberg, Expropriation Measures and State Trading, 1961 Proceedings of the
Am. Soc'y of Int'l Law 113.
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tive compensation." This is not a denial of the independent sovereignty,
or of every nation's right to, govern itself on whatever theory of govern-
ment or social order it cares to adopt. But a foreign government will
incur obligations if it changes suddenly from a position of responsibility
for the private property of foreigners to one denying their rights. The
adoption of a new governmental philosophy does not avoid the govern-
ment's obligation to foreigners and their property.
A nation would justly be considered as violating its faith, although that faith might
not be expressly plighted, which should suddenly and without previous notice, exer-
cise its territorial powers in a manner not consonant to the usages and received
obligations of the civilized world.' 2 1
In a case involving seizure of British properties, Great Britain presented
its position as follows:
The Government of His Britannic Majesty do not in any way intend to constitute
themselves judges of the legality or validity, from the point of view of the internal
law of Portugal, of the acts of the Portuguese Government. That is a matter of
internal politics with which they have no concern. But His Majesty's Government
are of opinion that the Portuguese State in taking possession, as it has done, of prop-
erty legally acquired by British nationals in conformity with the legislation of
Portugal and under the cover and protection of its public and private law, has acted
contrary to the principles of the law of nations which governs the relations between
states. It is part of the generally recognized principles of international law that
foreigners are subject to the laws of police and security of the state upon the
territory of which they find themselves, and that the laws of that state also govern
the rights of immovable property which they acquire there. In return for this
subjection, foreigners are entitled to count upon the legal protection and guarantees
under the cover of which they came into the country and acquired their rights.L -
B. The Lower Courts in the Sabbatino Case Misapplied
International Law
The lower courts held that the sugar company still had title to its
property in Cuba.
All persons, hold title to real property pursuant to the law of the place
where the property is situated, and acquire title to personal property in
accordance with the laws of the place where the title is acquired, and
hold such personal property pursuant to the law of the place where it is
held. The sugar was produced in Cuba by the sugar company which was
incorporated under the law of Cuba. The sugar company held title to all
its assets in Cuba under Cuban law; it could not hold property in Cuba
121. The Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, i1 US. (7 Cranch) 116, 137 (1812).
122. Fachiri, Expropriation and International Law, [1925] Brit. Yb. Intl L. 159, 168,
translating from the Observations G6nrales of the British Government in the Case of the
Portuguese Religious Properties (France, Great Britain & Spain v. Portugal), I U.N. Rep.
Int'l Arb. Awards 7 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1920), translated in 15 Am. J. Int'l L. 99 (1921).
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under any other law. No one holds title under international law; that
is a code of conduct, a breach of which creates a liability.
The decision of the lower courts in Sabbatino was that the sugar com-
pany held title to the sugar under Cuban law as it existed on or before
August 6, 1960, and the Cuban Government did not acquire title at a
later time under Cuban law. As justification for its determination that
the confiscatory law was ineffective and did not transfer title, the district
court cited one case. The court of appeals also cited this case and quoted
part of one paragraph from it. This quotation was as follows:
International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered
by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right
depending upon it are duly presented for their determination.' 2 3
The very next sentence which follows this quotation, if applied to the
Sabbatino case, directs the court when not to apply international law.
That sentence which follows the quotation above, and which was not
quoted by the court, reads:
For this purpose, where there is no treaty and no controlling executive or legislative
act, or judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized
nations .... 124
A few pages later there is a further statement which repeats the limita-
tion specified in the above quotation-a direction as to when interna-
tional law shall not be applied. In different but equally unequivocal lan-
guage, it reads:
This rule of international law is one which prize courts administering the law of
nations, are bound to take judicial notice of, and give effect to, in the absence of any
treaty or other public act of their own government in relation to the matter.12 6
Thus, the law of the United States is clearly set forth. International
law will indeed be interpreted and applied by the courts of the United
States as the law of the United States in a given case if relevant, but only
if the United States has not expressed its national will in some other
manner. The facts of the case from which the above quotations are taken
were these: A blockading squadron of the United States had, in the
Spanish-American War, seized two small fishing boats as prizes of war.
These vessels had attempted to sail through the blockade. The owners
of the fishing vessels claimed that persons and equipment engaged in
fishing were exempt under international law from seizure as prizes of war.
They claimed, therefore, that this seizure was wrongful and that the
United States must pay for the value of the vessels. Because of the nature
123. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
124. Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
125. Id. at 708. (Emphasis added.)
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of the judgment, one may infer that they had also asked for punitive
damages.
The question the Supreme Court long ago decided in that case was, in
short, whether the United States was liable for a wrongful act. The Court
searched for any affirmative statements of the national will in the form
of a treaty, legislative enactment or executive determination which would
indicate whether or not the United States desired or did not desire to
exempt fishing boats from the rigors of a blockade. Finding none, the
Court turned to international law, recognizing that international law was
the law of the United States, since it had not been changed or superseded
by some affirmative action of the Government. On this fact, the Supreme
Court found that the United States was liable under international law.
The Court spoke by a majority of six, and held that the United States
was liable to pay the value of the vessels, but not liable for exemplary
damage. The issue of title was not in the case.
The minority of three judges dissented; they were not sure that there
was any rule of international law so universally consistent that it might
be said that fishing boats were exempt from blockade. The minority also
observed that even if there were such a rule exempting fishing boats, it
applied only to small boats near their homeland; and the minority ques-
tioned whether or not the distance which these fishing boats had gone
entitled them to the relief as "local fishermen." The three judges then
expressed their opinion that the imposition of the blockade granted an
executive discretion to the commander of the blockading squadron
whether or not fishing boats would be allowed to ignore it. This deter-
mination, the minority thought, should be considered as a controlling
executive act, taken under the authority to impose and maintain the
blockade.
The same principle which was expressed above in the Paquete Habana
case-that international law is the law of the United States only in the
absence of other controlling law-is stated in still another and older case,
in which the opinion was written by Mr. Chief Justice Marshall:
If it be the will of the government, to apply to Spain any rule respecting cap-
tures, which Spain is supposed to apply to us, the government %%ill manifest that
will by passing an act for the purpose. Until such an act be passed, the court is
bound by the law of nations, which is part of the law of the land. 12 6
The cases cited above and relied on by the lower courts in the Sab-
batino case did not determine title to property in a foreign country. They
determined merely whether the United States had violated or might vio-
late international law. International law in those cases was the law of
the United States. There was no other relevant or guiding law at the
126. The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 423 (1815). (Emphasis added.)
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time of those cases which the courts were bound to apply. But if we are
to determine titles in a foreign country, then the law of the country under
which the title is claimed must be determined. The lower courts in the
Sabbatino case determined the title to the property in Cuba. The lower
courts held that a breach of international law voided a title acquired
under foreign local law; the cases above, which they cited, were no
authority for this proposition. Those cases cited by them directed them
by analogy to determine what was the law of Cuba. Under Cuban law
the title was transferred to Cuba. Of course, Cuba by that act became
liable for an international delinquency. But that wrongful act by Cuba
did not retransfer title and thus change Cuban law. The passage of the
Cuban law and seizures under it with transfer of title were the breach of
international law as found by our executive department.
In summary, it may be said that in determining title, whether the prop-
erty be in the United States or elsewhere in the world, courts will look
to the local law governing the acquisition and holding of property, real
or personal.
In determining the liability of a foreign country to the United States
and its nationals for any breach of international law, the standard of
conduct is international law as adopted by the United States.
The United States Supreme Court in the Sabbatino case reaffirmed
these principles which had long been precepts of American jurisprudence.
C. The Lower Courts' Decision in the Sabbatino Case Violated
the Principle of Equality Before the Law
If we but compare the two cases, Tag v. Rogers 27 and Sabbatino as
determined by the lower courts, we shall find that a different rule of law
and of the powers of sovereignty was applied to each. Thus was tempo-
rarily abandoned the principle of equality of litigants before the law.
In these two cases, we find two countries, the United States (in Tag)
and Cuba (in Sabbatino), have each stood before the same bar of justice,
the federal courts of the United States. Both countries were accused of
confiscating the privately-owned property of a foreigner. In both cases,
the facts showed that the respective countries had seized the property
of a foreigner and, under their respective laws, had taken title to it, but
had paid nothing for it. In both cases, the aggrieved foreigner had
127. 267 F.2d 664 (D.C. Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 904 (1960). See text accom-
panying note 95 supra. By treaty of 1952, the defeated Germany agreed for Its natfonals
not to claim liability. Convention with Great Britain, France and Germany (Bonn Con-
vention), May 26, 1952 (as amended by Schedule IV to the Protocol on the Termination
of the Occupation Regime in the Federal Republic of Germany, Oct. 23, 1954), ch. 6, art. 3,
ff 1, [1954] 6 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 5670, T.I.A.S. No. 3425. Validity of an act of state and possible
liability for committing it must be distinguished.
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received nothing for his property from any other source. In the respective
cases, both countries denied that their respective acts of uncompensated
seizure of the property of a foreigner were contrary to international law.
As to the United States (in the Tag case): These federal courts told
the foreigner that the seizure of his property by the United States was
in accordance with an Act of Congress; that when there is an Act of
Congress, the courts will enforce it, will not question its validity, whether
or not that act and the seizure under it be a violation of international law.
Decision: The United States, not the foreigner (a German), held title.
As to Cuba (in the Sabbatino case, as held by the lower courts): The
lower courts told Cuba that the law of Cuba under which it seized the
property of the foreigner was contrary to international law and therefore
was not effective; that Cuba did not have sovereign power to enact a
valid law of this nature; that these United States courts did not "sanc-
tion" such a law; that these United States courts would ignore it and
hold that the law of Cuba remained the same as it was before the con-
fiscatory act was promulgated and the seizure made. Decision: The
foreigner (an American), not Cuba, held title.
Equality before the law is absolutely essential to a stable society of nations. If it is
denied the alternatives are universal empire or universal anarchy.128
In the Sabbatino case the United States Supreme Court restored the
balance to the scales of justice.
XII. L'ENvoI
In the Sabbatino case, as it was decided by the lower courts, for the
first time in the history of the United States a United States court sat
in judgment upon the act of state of a foreign government and declared
that act to be ineffective to accomplish the national purpose. This was
an incursion by those lower courts into foreign relations over which the
executive department had heretofore had exclusive control.
The lower courts' decisions, by their own statements, were intended
to go beyond determination of the rights of the parties before them, to
affect international trade of the United States with Cuba for the purpose
of creating a sanction on the activities of another country. Regulation of
United States international trade is an exclusive prerogative of the Con-
gress.129
In deciding as they did, the lower courts subjected the sovereignty of
the United States to a limitation to be imposed upon its action by con-
currence of other countries, many of whose social and economic regimes
128. Dickinson, The Equality of States in International Law 335 (1920).
129. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 US. (9 Wheat.) 1, 196-97
(1824).
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differ from our own. The United States Supreme Court reversed the action
of the lower courts. It said:
The act of state doctrine does, however, have "constitutional" underpinnings. It
arises out of the basic relationships between branches of government in a system
of separation of powers. It concerns the competency of dissimilar institutions to
make and implement particular kinds of decisions in the area of international
relations.130  0
If the act of state doctrine is a principle of decision binding on federal and state
courts alike but compelled by neither international law nor the Constitution, its
continuing vitality depends on its capacity to reflect the proper distribution of
functions between the judicial and political branches of the Government on matters
bearing upon foreign affairs.' 31
One hundred and fifty years ago the United States Supreme Court had
before it for decision a legal controversy concerning the title of a ship
which had been American-owned but by an act of state of a foreign coun-
try had been condemned, and its title transferred to the Emperor of that
country. That ship was in a harbor of the United States; it was under
the court's jurisdiction. The former owners of that ship urged the Supreme
Court of the United States to do what the lower federal courts did in the
Sabbatino case-to declare void the title of the Emperor, and deliver the
ship to them.
One hundred and fifty years ago, the attorney of the United States for
the district of Pennsylvania, who, at the instance of the executive depart-
ment of the Government of the United States, had theretofore filed a
"suggestion" in the matter, argued that the United States Supreme Court
should decline jurisdiction, that it should not attempt to sit in judgment
upon the act of this foreign sovereign. He asserted that
if this court is to exercise jurisdiction upon subjects of tls nature, it will absorb
all the functions of government, and leave nothing for the legislative or executive
departments to perfom.132
In that case, one hundred and fifty years ago, the United States
Supreme Court declined jurisdiction.
130. 32 U.S.L. Week at 4236.
131. Id. at 4237.
132. The Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 126 (1812) (argu-
ment of Mr. Dallas, attorney for the district of Pa.).
